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ABSTRACT 
In 1997, Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation ("HKMC") has started its 
operation in Hong Kong. The objective of the corporation is to enhance the home 
ownership in Hong Kong. This study is to observe the performance ofthe corporation 
m the past and analyse whether the corporation accomplishes the objectives 
mentioned. 
The short history of Hong Kong mortgage market places the obstacle to 
HKMC in enforcing the mortgage securitization. Different voices from parties 
reflected the shaping of the "much better，mortgage corporation is needed. On one 
hand，Fannie Mae, an experienced US mortgage corporation, gives the advice and 
keeps tracks of the performances of HKMC. On the other hand, the interaction 
between the parties involved in this game is also the main task force in the process of 
modification. 
Suggestions will be given in order to upgrade the quality ofservices o fHKMC 
and facilitated the pace of maturity of the corporation in future. This will enhance the 
effectiveness of the home ownership. 
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In the past twenty years, Hong Kong act as the important financial center in 
Southeast Asia countries, the business infrastructure in Hong Kong was well established 
in general. The prosperity of the Hong Kong economy can be easily observed from the 
up-trend of the property market. 
Although property market is one of the emphases in the businesses in Hong Kong, 
it is lack of mortgage securitization in the market. The history is very green for the 
secondary mortgage market before the establishment of Hong Kong Mortgage 
Corporation ("HKMC"). Before the establishment of HKMC. there are only some banks 
in Hong Kong did the similar functions. They packed the their mortgage loans and sold 
them to the investors before the emergence of HKMC. The pace of the system of 
mortgage securitization is much slower than that in other western countries such as U.S. 
In April 1996, Hong Kong Monetary Authority ("HKMA") issued the proposal 
for the establishment of HKMC. However, it seems to arouse the reaction and voices 
from different parties. Many parties thought that HKMA seems to optimize the effect that 
HKMC will bring. Thus it is better to put the local perspective as well as the external 
factors into consideration. 
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After the HKMC proposal was made in 1996, there are many incidences 
happened that HKMA might not put them into account beforehand such as the effect 
from the Asian financial Crisis. Thus it is better to investigate whether the concept of 
mortgage institution can work under this unique business environment ~ Hong Kong 
which you cannot fmd it in another economy. Moreover, there are some new policies and 
adjustments in the operation of HKMC after it functioned at 4Q97. These are also the 
areas of investigation. 
In the paper, more emphasis wil l be put to analyze the concept and the strategy of 
HKMC. This is what the main idea of the paper. 
1.2 Methodology 
Although mortgage securitization is the finance-based topic, it is better not to put 
all the eggs into one basket. The reason is that the issue discussed in this project concerns 
not only the mechanism of HKMC. but also the interaction between different factors. 
Economic, political are also the main ingredients in the operation of the Hong Kone 
Mortgage Corporation. 
As the underlying concept of HKMC is raised from one of the large Mortgage 
Corporation in US, Fannie Mae, it is better to analyze the benefits that are feasible to 
happen in the Hong Kong local circumstances. It can be done by compare the ideal 
condition that the HKMC proposal made against the local context. Financial theories of 
Mortgage Corporation are sure the main areas that need to discuss in the project，as well 
as the adjustment that made after the set up o fHKMC. 
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Financial analysis based on the data in the previous period will also be 
investigated. The references of the information are based on the publication of HKMA, 
the annual report of the HKMC, as well as the market sources. Other than this, the 
interview with the people in banking sector is the way out to get the in-depth opinion and 
further information. These are valuable for shaping the "much better" Hong Kong 
Mortgage Corporation,. In order to get the updated information and keep track of the 
changes in the business environment, newspaper reports are the suitable channels to this 
issue. 
/ 
1.3 Source of Information 
For the paper, the information and the numerical figures are drawn from various 
sources: newspaper (Oriental Daily news, Sing Tao Daily news, South China Morning 
Post. Hong Kong Economist Daily News. Apple Daily News). Research reports, the 
publications from official institutions (such as HKMA. HKMC and Census & Statistics 
Department) and also the interview with the people concern are also ways to get the 
relevant information to it. 
One the major problems iii the information search is that although Hong Kong 
Mortgage Corporation was set iip，the history is too young to get the sufficient 
information to do the extensive research. In the macro context, the secondary mortgage 
market in Hong Kong is immature. The combination of these places an obstacle in 
drawing the conclusion. The way we can do is to refer back to the academic literature of 
the company in the mortgage market overseas. 
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To gather the opinions of different parties participated in the issue of the Hong 
Kong Mortgage Corporation, commercial banks and restricted licensed bank (RLB) can 
give much opinions in this area. Thus the people in various institutions (HSBC, Banque 
Nationale De Paris, Chekiang First Bank Limited, ORIX Asia Limited) are the targets. 
However, the difficulty is that banking sectors are not willing to express the opinion 
representing their institutions, as there may have some agency problems in it. Some 
valuable resources can be gained from the relationship between staff who are working in 
certain financial institutions and the author. 
1.4 Structure of the Paper 
The paper comprises 6 chapters. Chapter I mentions the framework of the paper 
and gives the brief introduction of the paper. Chapter II gives the brief concept of Hong 
Kong Mortgage Corporation and the infrastructure of the mortgage market in Hoiig 
Kong. Chapter III is the main theme of the paper. It gives the full analysis of the 
Mortgage Corporation, whether this corporation can adapt in this local context. Chapter 
IV mentions the incidences happened after the establishment o fHKMC and the rationale 
behind it. Chapter V mentions the effect and the response from different parties. Chapter 




THE EMERGENCE OF NEW VEHICLE � 
HONG KONG MORTGAGE CORPORATION 
For the new vehicle entrenched into the market, there must be some objectives to 
accomplish. There is no exception to the Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation. Concisely 
speaking, the main objectives, as mentioned in Mortgage Corporation Proposal (April 
1996), are to promote home ownership, improving banking and monetary slabilit> and 
facilitating the development of the local debt market. 
Ill order to investigate the reasons why the idea of Mortgage Corporation 
appeared in Hong Kong, the historical incidences could give the implications to us. Thus 
it is vei-y valuable to leave some paragraphs to describe it. As the issue is about the 
mortgage, it is better to understand the situation of mortgage market in Hong Kong and 
other relating areas as well. 
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II.1 History 
II.1.1 Reasons for the Property Boom (1990-1994) 
The story is started in the early 1990s. In the beginning of 1990s, there Is the 
property boom in Hong Kong. It is not difficult to understand the underlying reasons: 
a. Diminishing Real Interest Rate 
During that period, As the inflation rate is high, the economy seems to have the 
negative real interest rate. Thus the investors is not wise to put the capital into the 
banking sector to get the interest rate. As the real estate market is one the investment 
tools and also beneficial in long term, this became the favorable investment channel. 
b. Demand- Supplv Mechanism 
In the early 1990s, the property market is being out from the trough of the 
business cycle. The downturn of the property market due to the lack of confidence for 
both property developers and the buyers towards June 4 incidence in 1989 and the 
worries due to the uncertainty after the handover. As the pace ofhousing supply is not as 
fasl as the demand from the speculators and home buyers, this mechanism constituted the 
increase of prices. 
c. Chinese Economy and Psychological Effect 
It cannot deny that Chinese government has a strong capital base to support the 
property market in Hong Kong. Moreover, the trading between two places became more 
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frequently as many businesses have moved into the China province due to the low cost. 
This gives good impression and the confidence of the people in Hong Kong. 
II.1.2 Loan mix of the Banking Sector 
Because of the above reasons, there is an upsurge in the amount of mortgage loan, 
compared with the previous period. The banking sector in general intended to shift the 
loan books towards the property lending, despite the government intervention in the 
market.i On the other hand, Hong Kong government tries to tackle the overheated 
property market by setting the benchmark of 40% on the loan in the property market, and 
also restrict the mortgage ceiling from 90% to 70% in November 1991, 
II.1.3 Mortgage War 
The turning point is in the early 1996 as mortgage war was triggered bv 
competition from small banks in the mortgage market. This creates the great threat lo 
those large banks. This competition reduce the interest margin, decrease from 175 basis 
points above prime to 25 basis point above prime. The banking sector tries to expand 
their customer base，thus buyers of flat built under Home Ownership Scheme (HOS). On 
the other hand, interest rate deregulation pursued in 1994 made the volatile deposit base. 
The interaction between different incidences contributed to the emergence of new 
institution 〜Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation. 
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II.2 Framework o fHKMC 
As mentioned in the previous section, Fannie Mae backed the concept of HKMC. 
After the several reviews of the feasibility of the mortgage securitization in Hong Kong, 
Hong Kong Monetary Authority issued HKMC proposal in April 1996. The framework is 
shown in the followings.' 
Ownership 〜In the initial stage, the mortgage corporation is wholly owned by the 
government, the setting up of HKMC is supported by the use of Exchange Fund. After a 
certain period, HKMC will propose to widen the ownership through inviting private 
sector and/or public sector. The reason is that it needs to accumulate a larger capital 
reserve to enhance its credit worthiness. 
Capital Base 〜As lhe target to build the mortgage portfolio is HK$20 billion and 
the ratio of capital base to total assets be 5% in the initial years, the capital base will be 
$1 billion. The ratio has already doubled than that of Faiinie Mae and Freddie Mac. It is 
expected to be adequate to absorb losses in the extreme market conditions. 
Structure 〜foui. main departments constitute it: Operations. Finance. Credit and 
Technology. Apart froni this, the large volume of legal work are audited by the legal 
team. The Chief Executive Officer and other senior staff would be appointed by the 
Board of Directors. 
* 
‘Table 1 shows the figure of the loan and advances that use in the purchase of properties, the 
period is from December 1997 to September 1998, based on the quarterly figure. The data are given by 
Hong Kong Census & Statistics Department. 
2 The details in mentioned at the HKMC Proposal 
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II.3 Mechanism ofHKMC 
As the secondary market in Hong Kong is immature, HKMC becomes the catalyst 
to this deficiency. In the secondary mortgage market, it can into two categories: sell and 
swap. The market provides the mechanism for the mortgage lenders and passes the risk of 
mortgage lending to the institutional investors. Thus the Mortgage Corporation does not 
need to bear the default risk iii the theoretical sense. For the operation of Hong Kong 
Mortgage Corporation, Appendix 1 shows the highlights. In the proposal, the expansion 
o fHKMC divided into two phases. 
First Phase 〜Purchasing of mortgage for retained portfolio 
In the initial stage, the corporation woiild concentrate on purchasing the 
residential mortgage loan for its retained portfolio. The funding is derived from the issue 
of the unsecured debt securities. This method is adopted in the initial stage, because the 
structure is not well established. Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) is nol issued in this 
development stage due to the complexities. 
Second Phase 〜Packaging mortgages into MBS and providing guarantee 
for the timely payment of the principal and interest 
When the parties in the secondary mortgage market are more familiar with the 
operation, Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation can consider introducing MBS programme. 
The mechanism is that the catalyst, HKMC, will package the mortgage loans from its 
own portfolio and from authorized institutions into mortgage backed securities, and 
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provide the guarantee on the timely payment of interest and principal; on the other hand, 
there is a guarantee fee in return. 
II.4 Phenomenon of the Mortgage Market in Hong Kong 
As the mortgage market is mainly based on the residential loans in the economy, 
it is better to consider the situation of residential mortgage loans in Hong Kong. From the 
statistical data, the number of private residential units increased more than doubled from 
^ 
1980 to 1995/ Also Hong Kong, similar to the developed economies such as UK and 
USA, enjoys the positive relationship between residential mortgage loan and GDP per 
capital. This seems to be a good sign for Hong Kong mortgage market. 
After the Asian financial turmoil, the property market tends to fall into the market 
slump. This indirectly affects the mortgage markei. The laci is shown iii the relationship 
between GDP change and the mortgage loan approved in the past few years/ Actually, 
the change of GDP will be keep on line with the moi1gage loans. However, from the 
Graph 2. it reflects that there is a negative relationship between the change in the new 
loan approved during the month and the change in GDP during the month. The result can 
be explained from the following reason: there is the time lag between the loan approved 
and the change came from the change in GDP. Moreever, the seasonal fluctuation is 
3 Source: Table 3 in the HKMC proposal. The valuation is based on the 1995 prices. 
4 Graph 1 & 2 show the relationship between the change in the GDP and the new loans approved, 
dated from March 1996 to September 1998. The source is from the Census and Statistics Department 
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embedded in Hong Kong property market. Thus the statistical data came out with this 
manner. 
However, there are policies pursued by Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region after the handover, for example, the governor Mr. Tung Chee Wah mentioned 
that the government suggested the combined annual production of Home Ownership 
Scheme (HOS) and the Private Sector Participation Scheme (PSPS) should be 85,000 
units. The mortgage market vvill be recovered in future. More words will discuss this 
point later in the paper. 
In terms of maturity, Hong Kong has the strong primary mortgage market, it is 
due to robust banking sector, high quality mortgage loans, fairly standardized lending 
standard and well technologies capabilities. Conversely, as mentioned previously, the 
situation is not for secondary mortgage market. Moreover, the development of the 
secondary mortgage market is driven by a long-term vision, not in reaction to short term 
incidence such as those in housing market or credit system. It is different from that in 




THE WHOLE PICTURE 
In the proposal of Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation released in June 1996, it is 
suggested that the benefits ofHKMC can be categorized into four groups: a) contribution 
to home financing; b) banking stability; c) monetary stability and d) development of debt 
market which are mentioned in Chapter III in the proposal. Although this new vehicle 
seems to bring many advantages to Hong Kong economy, there may be some practical 
problems and the limitation in pursuing the mechanism of Mortgage Corporation. This 
chapter has also left some spaces to discuss the difference between the nature of 
mortgage market in US. Canada and Hong Kong. As mentioned in Chapter I. the concept 
of HKMC is imitated from Fannie Mae. the area concerning the mortgage backed 
securities (MBS) of Fannie Mae will be described for reference as well. 
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III.1 Benefits ofHong Kong Mortgage Corporation 
III.1 • 1 Contribution to Home Financing 
As mentioned in the first paragraph in Chapter II, the main objective is to 
accomplish the home ownership in Hong Kong. This can be achieved by ensuring the 
availability of mortgage funds, which vvill alleviate the potential upward pressure on the 
mortgage interest rate, in turn it will also alleviate the cost of borrowing. 
In order to forecast the shortfall of mortgage funds, Hong Kong Monetary 
Authority used two different approach to estimate the potential demand of mortgage and 
the shortfall. 
The first approach is to project the demand of residential mortgage loans by using 
projected housing supply. From Table 2, it shows the figure predicted in the proposal. 
This approach based on the projected housing supply and the assumption on the loan-to-
valuation ratios (LTV) (70% for flats for private housing and 90% for the public 
housing). It projects mortgage demand for the period 1996-2005 to be HK$ 931.5 billion 
in 1995 prices. According to the assumption of annual production after handover, this 
shortfall will be smaller as Tung Chee Wah, the governor of Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region, mentioned that the number of HOS/PSPS created will be 85.000 
units per year. This narrows the shortfall of mortgage loan that the mortgage market 
needs. Table 3 indicates the amount of shortfall based on, the new policy proposed 
(85,000 units/year)5 
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The second approach is to project the funding gap between the potential demand 
and the amount of mortgage loans that the banking system able to provide. Graph 3 
shows the trend of Demand- supply Gap in home financing. This approach is based on 
three assumption: l.The nominal GDP growth is assumed to be 13.5% per annum; 2. 
Supply of mortgage loans by banks remains constant at 30% of nominal GDP 3. Demand 
for mortgage rises from 30% ofGDP in 1995 to 50% in 2005. 
As Mortgage Corporation creates the supply of the funds for mortgage, it raises 
the price of property. This is suitable to the present situation as the property market falls 
to the bottom after the Asian financial crisis. This mechanism can act as one of the 
catalyst to facilitate the recovery of the market in a certain extent. 
However the real situation are diverted to what the forecast shows in the property 
development. Table 4 gives the less optimistic view towards the property market and the 
mortgage supply. The discrepancy is due to the macro-economic factors that will be 
mentioned in section IV.7 later/’ 
111.1.2 Banking Stability 
Hong Kong Monetary recognized that there is the maturity mismatch between 
mortgage loans, the inter-bank borrowing and mortgage loans as the mortgage loans have 
5 The assumption of the calculation is based on the followings annual production under HOS 
scheme is 50,000 units & that under PSPS is 35,000 units. 
6 The model is similar to the working assumption that stated in Diagram 3.2 mentioned in HKMC 
Proposal in April 1996, but the nominal GDP growth is based on the GDP growth rate in 1996, compared 
to the previous year: 12.9% p.a. 
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the contractual life of 15.2 years on average while the former have mostly less than 3 
months. Apart from this, if the unexpected decline in the prepayment rate makes the 
actual maturity of the residential mortgage loans lengthens, the banking sector wil l be 
exposed to the funding risk. From the portray of the average contractual life of mortgage 
loans in 2H98, it can precept that the maturity period is in the decreasing trend, this 
relieves the funding risk of the banking sector.^ Moreover, one thing needs to take into 
account is that the sectoral risk happens i f the banking sector becomes too reliant on one 
line of business. Thus HKMC plays an important role in the stability of the banking 
sector. 
III.1.3 Monetary Stability 
According to the concept of HKMA. HKMC encourages the origination of fixed 
rate mortgage loans. Thus the Mortgage Corporation is free from interest rate risk as the 
matching can minimize it. It can insulate the risk incurred by the home buyers as they 
suffered from the floating rate mortgages. The reason is that "in the event of a sharp rise 
in the interest rate, mortgage rcife may increase. This u7// havc implicafions on the cash 
flow of home cmners, yvho are the niain borrowers, \vilh a potential impact on the 
properly market and consequently the banking system. This reflects the pain tolerance 
level of Hong Kong people and the economy to possible interest rate shocks “ (paragraph. 
3.16, HKMA Proposal-April 1996) . 
7 Graph 4 shows the trend of the average of contractual life of the mortgage loans, sorted from the 
residential mortgage survey from Hong Kong Monetary Authority, dated from June 1998 to Dec 1999 
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III.1.4 Development of debt market 
The history of the secondary mortgage market in Hong Kong is very short, thus 
Mortgage Corporation act as the facilitator to speed up the development of the market. In 
US, the development of the mortgage market becomes the second most important, 
following behind the treasury bonds. It results from the unsecured debt securities issued 
by three key mortgage corporations (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae). 
Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation also provides more investment alternatives for 
the investors and the financial institutions. HKMC issues the unsecured debt papers in the 
first stage and Mortgage Backed Securities wil l be issued in the second stage. These 
kinds of debt securities perform the similar function as the Exchange Fund bills and 
notes. Thus it wil l increase the supply of the high profile debt securities. 
III.2 Mortgage Market in United States. 
Canada & Hona Kong 
Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation (HKMC) takes the advice from the American 
Mortgage Corporation. Fannie Mae, in the development of the corporation in the initial 
stage. As stated previously, the underlying concept is based on that of Fannie Mae, which 
is formed according to the business environment of the country. In order to understand 
whether the operation of HKMC is suitable for Hong Kong, it is better to observe the 
difference between these three markets in order to give some insights about it. 
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III.2.1 Hong Kong 
The secondary mortgage market in Hong Kong is still in the growth stage as the 
history, as mentioned in section II.4, is relatively short. Local mortgages were 
overwhelming in the terms of floating rate instead of fixed rate, therefore the borrowers 
usually are the ones who need to bear the interest rate risk. Although there are mortgage 
war and interest rate deregulation happened in 1990s that adversely affected the mortgage 
businesses, mortgage still acts as the profitable tools to the banking sector. After the 
handover, the Asian financial crisis came that makes the mortgage businesses become 
more risky as the property market fluctuated in a lar^ie extent. 
lII.2.2 United States 
Not like Hong Kong, the fixed rate mortgages dominate the mortgage market. The 
intention of the development of secondary mortgage market is to off loan mortgages due 
to the maturity mismatch. The fixed rate mortgages dominate the market because of the 
regulation for adjustable-rate mortgages. It differs from that ofHong Kong as banks bear 
the interest rate risk. The main reason why the banks want to off load the mortgages is 
because oftwo reasons: firstly, the market rate exceeds the fixed mortgage rate, this made 
Uie banking sector suffers a lot in the mortgage businesses in 1980. Secondly, during 
1980-1986，the capital was shifted to other channels such as money market and bond 
market. The reason is that based on the landmark Depository Institutions Deregulation 
and the Monetary Control legislation, the policy ofinterest rate ceiling was terminated. In 
order to minimize the losses from this, the banking sector were forced to of f load 
mortgages that enhance the development of the secondary mortgage market. 
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111 United States, mortgages are written for long terms in excess of twenty years, 
but may be repaid at any time subject to the certain prepayment penalties. American 
mortgages are generally much more expensive to put into place with various fees payable 
to brokers and institutions plus much higher legal and registration costs than those for a 
similar Canadian transaction. Although most American mortgages may be repaid prior to 
the lengthy maturity, the prepayment penalties and new financing fees are considerably 
high. Prepayment patterns on American mortgages are somewhat predictable based upon 
experience in markets, given interest rates and other economic factors. However, they 
cannot be predicted exactly since other conditions cannot be known in advance. 
lII.2.3 Canada 
As different from mortgage market in United States. Canadian mortgages are 
written for relatively short terms, of usually one. three or five > ears for both single and 
multi-family residential mortgages. There are man>’ flexible forms of mortgages such as 
\ ariable and adjustable rate mortgages and totally open short-term mortgages. 
The mortgage industry in Canada consists primarily of the chartered banks, large 
retail trust companies, credit unions and some smaller trust companies and 
intermediaries. Primary intermediaries are any institutions which originate mortgages but 
do so only to resell them to some other institution or investor; therefore they do not carry 
the mortgage on their books. Many smaller trust companies and brokerage firms do this 
and even the large banks and trust companies resell or syndicate a part of their larger 
loans. In the context of the mortgages backed securities, all the institutions involved are 
really intermediaries between the borrowers and an unknown investors or lender. 
19 
Most of the lending done by the traditional institutions is in single or multi-family 
residential mortgages, which are supported by a registered first charge against the 
property being mortgaged. Although insurance companies in Canada have substantial 
mortgage portfolios, they are active primarily in the commercial segment of the market 
and many of their loans are acquired in the secondary market since they are not usually 
retail lenders. 
III.3 Limitations ofHong Kong Mortgage Corporation 
In the proposal (HKMC Proposal, April 1996), it creates the beautiful picture for 
HKMC. However, it cannot deny that there are limitations in the setting up and 
developing the corporations. The approach that used in this section is to collect the 
opinions from the staff of the banking sector to comment on the HKMC proposal, 
according to the benefits mentioned in it. 
III.3.1 Banks do not urgent to sell the mortgages 
In the banking sector in Hong Kong, it can mainly categorized into two groups: 
one group comprises those banks, which mainly based in Hong Kong, for example, 
HSBC, Hang Seng Bank, Standard Chartered Bank etc. On the other hand, there are some 
banking institutions which bases are located overseas such as Citibank & Chase 
I 
Manhattan Bank. Actually, they have different attitudes towards the selling of mortgages 
to HKMC. 
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a. The Attitudes of Local Banks 
In Hong Kong mortgage market, the maturity period of the mortgages is usually 
in long term, which is different from that in Canada and US. This will create the maturity 
mismatch inside the banking sector as the deposits in the banks are usually short term in 
nature. Because of this phenomenon, the banking sector has already regarded this as the 
inherent factor. 
In order to deal with this issue, local banks have their own strategies towards it. 
As mentioned in the proposal, "Similarly, there is a high business risk ifbanks become 
too reliant on income from one line of business and competitive conditions in that market 
change adversely. “ (Paragraph 3.14. HKMC Proposal, April 1996) Although the high 
return from the mortgage lending, the banks keep the mortgage lending under the control 
by increasing the non-property lending. 
Apart from this, banks also try to minimize the maturity mismatch in the banking 
sector through the inter-bank transaction and matching strategy. In terms of short term 
deposits in Hong Kong, they try to evade the matiirit>. mismatch by lending out part of 
the customer deposits in the inter-bank market. On the other hand, as the mortgage loans 
are mainly in long term, banks can use the long-term debt to finance the mortgages. 
Local banks regards the maturity mismatch as the inherent factor, this makes them 
have less incentive to take the remedy action. Moreover, as mentioned in the previous 
paragraph, they took some strategies to minimize the mismatch. Thus the local banks do 
not urgent to sell the mortgage out. 
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b. The Attitudes of Foreign Banks 
Compared to the local banks, the foreign banks are more willing to sell the 
mortgages. Foreign banks usually have the strong and large funding base that they do not 
want to do the businesses under various constraints. Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation 
activate the assets of the banks by liquidate the mortgages, this is what the foreign banks 
willing to see. 
Before the concept of mortgage corporation raised by Hong Kong Monetary 
Authority, the private label mortgage backed securities had already existed in the market. 
As the foreign banks have much knowledge about the mortgage securitization, they have 
more confidence to minimize the uncertainty in decision making, compared to the local 
banks. Thus the foreign banks are more willing to sell the mortgages. 
The differentiated attitudes within the banking sector in Hong Kong diminish the 
pool of mortgages that Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation can choose to buy. This, in 
turn, will indirectly affect the amount of mortgages loans that the banks accept and 
adversely deter the effectiveness in accomplish the objective ofhome ownership. 
Ho\ve\ er. we can have an optimistic view towards the market of mortgage loans. 
It is reflected from the attitudes of the banks announced at 10^ '' July, 1998. There were 18 
banks in which they are willing to sell the mortgages totally worth HK$136.5 billion to 
HKMC. This amount exceeds the predicted figure (HK$130 billion). Mr. S.T. Pang, 
ChiefExecutive Officer ofHKMC, said that it was possible for the offering of sovereign-
credit securities through private placement. The reason is that HKMC decided to 
purchase the mortgages which are around HK$100 billion in total, now it just purchase 
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HK$60-70 billion from those 18 banks. Thus the remaining quota can leave for the 
purpose mentioned above. ^  
III.3.2 Limit Capital Base 
It cannot deny Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation brings advantages to Hong 
Kong economy, however, in the initial stage. Mortgage Corporation functions in the 
budget constraints. In the initial stage, HKMC only has HK$1 billion and assume the 
capital adequacy requirement of 5%, it can only build the mortgage loan of HK$20 
billion. This amount is relative small compared to the total residentia! mortgage 
outstanding. This means that HKMC can only absorb the limited amount of mortgages 
from the banking sector. 
III.3.3 The Issue ofFixed Rate Mortgages 
From the nature of Hong Kong mortgage market, the overwhelming mortgages 
are in floating term. By the mechanism in HKMC mentioned in the proposal，it can 
simultaneously escaped from the interest rate risk and encouraged the origination of fixed 
mte mortgage loans. HKMC buys the fix rate mortgages with fixed rate funds borrowed 
from the debt market. 
In the floating rate scheme, the interest rate risk is borne by the borrowers. 
Although the home buyers can insulate from the risk from the action of HKMC, it is 
doubtful whether it can successfully reach the goal as the banking sector have no 
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incentive to offer fixed rate mortgages. This is because in normal circumstance, the 
banking sector only needs to bear little risk. However, the action of issuing the fixed rate 
papers by HKMC wil l benefit the foreign banks. It is because as mentioned in section 
II.3, they get the fixed rate papers issued by HKMC from the swap action of fixed 
mortgage portfolio. 
III.4 Practical Problems ofMortgage Corporation 
In the proposal, it seems to be window-dressed the true picture of Hong Kong 
Mortgage Corporation. In theoretical sense, the concept from mortgage corporation in 
United States, Fannie Mae, is ideally put into operation in HKMC, however, there are 
obstacles that need to overcome practically. What the ideal picture perceived may be 
totally different from the true one. 
III.4.1 Differential Attitudes o fHKMC & Banking Sector 
In the initial stage of the development of HKMC. you can recognize that the 
banks that sold lhe mortgages to HKMC are those banks with less capital. The “local 
banks，，such as HSBC and Standard Chartered Bank announced that they would not sell 
the mortgages in the near future. 
As mentioned in the first paragraph, the banks with less capital wil l likely be the 
targets of HKMC. In March 1998，Dao Heng Bank and Chase Manhattan Bank 
participated the testing plan invented by HKMC, the details are shown in Appendix 2. In 
this scheme, the fixed mortgage rate is 10%, the duration is 3 years. The amount is totally 
8 The article was from July 10, 1997 (Oriental Daily News) 
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HK$ 5 billion. At that instant, the floating rate is 11.5%, thus the banking sector can earn 
1% difference in selling the mortgages to Hong Kong Mortgages Corporation. 
Although the banking sector can choose the mortgages they sell to HKMC, on the 
other hand, HKMC can also choose the kind of mortgages it likes. From the opinion of 
the banking sector, they would like to choose those mortgages which has the low default 
risk, for example, those has been existed for more than 2 years. Thus this "cherry 
picking" effect wi l l make the over estimation of the amount of mortgage loans that the 
_ banking sector are willing to supply. 
Another major problem is that after the Asian financial crisis, the property market 
has downturned in a large extent. The secondary mortgage rate in the banking sector in 
2H98 ranged between the prime rate and the prime rate plus 50-75 basis points, according 
to the strategies of the companies. In January 1999. the prime rate is 8.75?/o, which is 
much lower than that when HKMC launched the scheme to Dao Heng Bank and Chase 
Manhattan Bank. Now the extent becomes more fierce as the prime rate fell to 8.50% and 
lhe majority of the interest margin on new loans approved ranged from best lending rate 
(BLR) to 0.25% above BLR. Appendix 3 sliows the rate of the banks in the secondary 
mortgage market. I f HKMC still adopted the fixed mortgage rate of 10%, then it wil l 
deter the intention of the banks to sell the mortgages to HKMC. Are there any 
modifications that HKMC made towards this issue? In the Chapter IV，some areas wil l be 
given to discuss about this. 
4 
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III.4.2 Unclear attitudes of the parties that related to HKMC: 
Are they the helpers or the enemies? 
In the development of Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation, the supporting parties 
have the certain effect in the performance of HKMC. Although the HKMC proposal has 
not mentioned the influence of the supporting parties, it is not difficult to imagine that 
HKMA has already put this into consideration. Now I put some words to talk about it. In 
the initial stage of the development of HKMC, it wil l issue debt securities to finance the 
mortgage loans it buys. Thus observing the issue created by this type of financing is one 
of the tasks. 
a. Investors 
In Chapter II. the mechanism of HKMC mentioned that we need to sell the debt 
securities to the investors, but it raised the issue: "In what way should the debt securities 
be sold? To which person?" From the previous experiences. HKMA usually sell the 
exchange fund bills and notes through the auction. The selling of debt securities can also 
use this approach as the result the previous example is not bad. Moreover, HKMA 
accumulated the experience in managing the auctioning activities. However, it needs to 
pay special attention to the marketability of the debt securities. One way HKMC pursues 
now is to assign the primary dealers to tackle this. 
4 
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h. Credit Ratin2 A2encv 
Another dilemma is that whether the debt securities issued by HKMC should be 
rated. This also applies to the mortgage backed securities that HKMC will issue in the 
later stage. On one hand, the rating are favorite to the overseas investors as they may not 
have much information about the securities, they invest in it just according to the rating 
of credit rating agencies. This can enlarge the market of the debi securities. On the other 
hand, i f the rating is not favorable, the loss from it wil l overshoot the benefits that it 
gained from the effort HKMC paid to promote itself previously. This can be shown from 
the words given by David Carse, Deputy Chief Executive of Hong Kcng Monetary 
Authority: "A credit rating agency has do^vngraded a particular bank or given it an 
adverse rating coiilci result in a loss ofpiiblic confidence and thus give rise to funding 
difficiiUies. "^ The adverse rating will adversely affect the marketability that mentioned 
above. It is difficult to put the role ofcredit rating agencies in the correct position. 
c. Insurance Companies 
ln 4Q98. HKMC proposed to increase the ceiling ofthe mortgage loans from 70% 
lo 85% of the property that the banking sector. The additional 15% will be borne by the 
insurance companies. Appendix 4 gives the brief framework of this proposed action. 
However, this action will have two points need to put into consideration. Firstly, the 
expansion of mortgage loans lend may increase the default risk of the mortgage holders. 
From the data shown in the Graph 5, the rate that mortgages are unpaid still keeps on the 
9 "Regulators and the Rating Agencies", in the HKMA Quarterly Bulletin, May 1996 
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increase trend. The mortgages that unpaid for over 3 months increase from 0.78% in 
November 1998，0.84% in December 1998 to 1.07% in February 1999. Secondly, 
whether the insurance companies brings the advantages to the mortgage market and just 
regards this as one of the income channels still in the question. 
III.4.3 Over Optimistic ofRisk Management 
In HKMC proposal, it notified that there are four types of risks involved in the 
operation ofHKMC. However, there may be some points that over optimize the ability in 
managing the risks. 
In the mechanism of mortgage corporation, the issue of mortgage backed 
securities is one of the areas that need to observe. However, HKMA still did not the 
concrete idea about the issuing of mortgage backed securities since 1997. As mortgage 
backed securities wil l be launched in the near future, the risks attached to it also become 
one of the considerations. 
a. Risks arising from Operation 
a. 1 Credit Risk 
In HKMC proposal, it stated that the adoption of prudent purchasing standards be 
the solution to minimize the credit risk. "The best safeguard against the credit risk of 
mortgage loans is the adoption of prudent purchasing standards. “ (Paragraph 6.3, 
HKMC proposal, April 96). Moreover, it also assumed that the default/delinquency rate 
of mortgage loans has historically been very low in Hong Kong. However, the downfall 
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of the property prices will lead to the increase in the default risk. It can be seen from the 
Graph 5 that the default/ delinquency rate persistent increased since June 1998. However, 
it seems that HKMA does not have the intention to create the credit enhancement 
facilities in the near future, the rationale behind this may be that this action need to take 
the extra costs into account. Also, HKMA does not perform the task in assessing the risk 
of the mortgage-backed securities, thus it makes it difficult for it to judge the protection 
to make. Moreover, the investors are doubt about the level of protection they have from 
the mortgage-backed securities. 
There are some adjustments in the purchasing standards after the set up of HKMC 
ill order that also influence the credit risk. For example, in the proposed plan, HKMC 
only purchases only mortgages which are first legal charges. Equitable mortgages and 
mortgages which are second legal charges will not be accepted. After the set up of 
HKMC, it also accepted the mortgages which have the second legal charges. The reason 
is that after the Asian financial crisis, the downturn of property prices will make the 
mortgage loans whose are first legal charges more risky than that have second legal 
charges. Thus the acceptance of mortgage loan will lower the credit risk," 
ci.2 Interest Rate Risk 
For the interest rate risk, the main concern is the interest rate mismatch that was 
similar to the experiences faced by Fannie Mae in the early 1980s. In order to cope with 
the interest rate mismatch, HKMC can adopted the interest rate swap. (The mechanism is 
shown in Appendix 5) However, it is difficult to avoid the basis risk, the difference in the 
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reference rates between the mortgage loans, which is based on the best lending rate, and 
the debt papers, which is based on Hong Kong Interbank Offer Rate ("HIBOR"). 
Apart from this, it is quite hard to predict the cost of funding, whether HKMC 
buys the fixed rate or floating rate depends on the situation in the economy and the 
interest rate fluctuation. In the past, HKMA was able to borrow at the rate lower than 
HIBOR, thus this may have the advantage for HKMC to issue the fixed rate papers. 
а.3 Prepayment Risk 
The risk needs to pay special attention, as this is the complicate issue. Prepayment 
011 the mortgage may occur because rates fall substantially below the mortgage rate the 
homeowner is paying. This is exactly happened in Horig Kong after the Asian financial 
crisis. Prepaying the mortgage for this reason is called "rational exercise" of the option. 
Exercising the prepayment option in other cases (such as moving for a newjob) is called 
"irrational exercise" because such behavior is not tied directly to interest savings. The 
) 
nature is similar to the issue of callable bonds mentioned in the proposal. (Paragraph 
б.10. HKMC proposal. April 1996) 
Rational exercise of prepa> ment options forces the mortgage holders lo reinvest 
their funds at rates substantially below those they would have earned if prepayment had 
not occurred. Moreover, since mortgages typically have maturity much longer than those 
of most other assets and liabilities, the earnings loss is felt over a longer period of time. 
Uncertainty concerning repayment of principal makes conventional yield measures 
unreliable indicators of the return wil l be expected from holding mortgage-backed 
securities. Although HKMC can evade the prepayment risk by passing the risk to the 
10 The newspaper cutting is dated at 30"' June, 1998 (Oriental Daily News & Apple Daily News) 
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MBS holders, this may be a deterrent for the potential investors to become the MBS 
holders. It wil l indirectly affect the marketability of the mortgage-backed securities. 
HKMC need to strike the balance between the two. 
History reveals that the prepayment risk is not so serious within the mortgage 
portfolio as well as the mortgage outstanding in the market. Graph 6 shows the trend of 
monthly prepayment of the mortgage portfolio in 1998. The percentage of full 
prepayment moves in the same direction as ihe activity ofthe residential property market. 
As the property market require a certain period of time for recovery, the full prepayment 
wil l not be too large in the near future. Moreover, the partial prepayment remains 
relatively constant and stays in a small percentage. Although the seriousness of the 
prepayment risk is not great, precaution still needs lo do in this aspect. 
a.4 Operational Risk 
In the initial stage. HKMC will only accept a limit amount of mortgage loans. 
Thus HKMC can use the low volume technology platform to operate. Similar io the other 
institutions that use computer system, it also needs to solve Y2K problems. Although this 
is only the minor problem, but it cannot be disregarded. 
b. Risks arisiim from issuiim of mortaage backed securities 
At this instant, the second stage of the development of HKMC- issuing the 
mortgage-backed securities as the source of finance, have not enforced yet. However, it 
can put the first step to investigate the potential risks occurred in the issuing of MBS by 
observing the risks embedded in the MBS overseas such as Canadian MBS. 
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b.l Delivery Risk 
In the mortgage-backed securities, there is a delivery risk associated with each 
MBS pool. As product is accumulated, most issuers enter into an agreement with a dealer 
to provide an MBS of certain size and terms. Once this contract is firmed up it constitutes 
mandatory delivery. 
The risk of being unable to provide delivery in the Canadian MBS market should 
not be underestimated as it can cause several other problems with the pool being 
accumulated. The most obvious cause of delivery failure, particular for single family 
lenders, is a decrease in rates and a loss of borrowers unless the lender decreases the 
commitment interest rate. Notwithstanding the commitment contract, borrowers will not 
close on the mortgages when the market interest rate is lower than that committed, by 
some threshold amount. The threshold vvill vary for individuals and depends on other 
economic factors and expectations. Knowing the threshold level vvill help the issuer 
determine the extent to which the fallout risk should be hedged. A further problem with 
fallout when accumulating large multi-family loans is the effect a reduction in the total 
pool has on the eligibility of other loans. Delay can affect the eligibility of more loans 
which may be approaching six months from initiation and further deplete the pool. The 
eligibility of each loan becomes a real concern during the period of accumulation and is 
part of the delivery risk. 
Since the delivery risk increases inversely with interest rates, it is asymmetric and 
should be hedged with long call options. Losses from fallout can be offset by gains on the 
call option. 
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b.2 Interest Rate Risk 
Similarly, the issue arising from the interest rate volatility also contribute in the 
V 
issuing of mortgage backed securities. The risk of a decrease in the MBS price or value 
following an increase in the interest rates is the risk usually considered by issuers. The 
risk can be quantified as MBS pools will reflect changes in rates immediately since they 
are priced like bonds. To the extent the issuer has committed fixed interest rates, he has 
incurred this risk in addition to that of delivery fallout. This price risk between the time 
of commitment and funding is best offset by the purchase of pul options. 
b.3 Issue ill the pricing of mortgage backed securities 
In the aspect of Canadian MBS, the pools of MBS are priced relative to Canada 
bonds approximately 15-30 days prior to delivery. The inierest rate risk transfers to the 
dealer once all the terms and the prices ha\ e been set, thus the time from pricing at a 
fixed rate to delivery is a function of economic factors and the current market for MBS 
issues. Ho\ve\er. there are no government bonds for the MBS issued by HKMC for 
reference. This is the area that needs to investigate. 
Even the prices of mortgage backed securities are set. the risks invoh'ed in 
actually negotiating the pricing of the MBS cannot be directly quantified and offset with 
options as they involve some value judgments by the issuer. They must be considered 
when identifying the extent to which the issuer needs to hedge interest rate risk and the 
I 
general level of risk that wil l be borne by the issuer. 
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CHAPTER IV 
PERFORMANCE OF THE MORTGAGE MARKET 
& HKMC AFTER SET UP 
Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation has already set up for more than 1 year since 
4Q97. As il is the first time that the concept of mortgage corporation put into effect in 
Hong Kong, there must be some modifications that HKMC need to make in order to cope 
with the inefficiency. This is what actiialiy done by fIKMC currently. Whal policies and 
the strategies are used by HKMC? Are they similar to that pursued by mortgage 
corporation in U.S? In this Chapter, all the questions will be answered in the following 
paragraphs. 
As the origination of HKMC is based on the residential mortgage loans, the trend 
in the past is one of the important ingredients to give the basic perception and the process 
to forecast the future environment of the mortgage market. 
IV.1 Pilot Scheme ofFixed Rate Mortgage in Hong Kong 
t 
The concept of the mortgage securitization of HKMC is to issue the fixed rate 
mortgages. On 26^ '^  January 1998, the board of Directors of Hong Kong Mortgage 
Corporation agrees to issue the scheme to promote the fixed rate mortgages. The rationale 
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is to provide more channels for the investors a more variety in choosing the mortgage 
terms, given that the majority of the mortgages are in the floating term. 
The idea of the pilot scheme is to issue 3-year or 5-year bonds worth HK$200 
billion for the Housing Authority to purchase. The fixed rate interest on the bond would 
be 8%. HKMC will charge a service fee of 2%. It is expected that the interest rate for 
mortgage loan to home buyers under the governmenl-subsidized Home Ownership 
Scheme (HOS) and Sandwich Class Housing Scheme would be 10.5%, thus the banks 
would earn a profit margin of 0.5%.‘‘ 
It is very risky for the company to issue the new technique in this changing 
economy, there is no exception to HKMC. In order to minimize the risks, the sample 
testing can be done in order to get the response from the parties concern. On March 17, 
1998. Financial Secretary Sir Donald Tsaiig Yam-kuen announced that Dao Heng Bank 
and Chase Manhattan Bank joined a 6-month pilot scheme. They are the first two banks 
in Hong Kong to provide the fixed rate mortgages to customers. In this scheme, HKMC 
will buy iip to HK$250 million in fixed-rate mortgages, the reason to pursue the fixed 
rate scheme is lo give pressure to the floating rate, at lhal time. the floating mortgage rate 
i s l l % . 
After the agreement of the pilot scheme between Dao Heng Bank, Chase 
Manhattan Bank and HKMC, the interest rate was decreased. Thus HKMC need to adjust 
the mortgage rate for the newly originated fixed rate mortgages in order to lower the 
funding cost. To cope with the changing economic situation, HKMC lowers the mortgage 
“Appendix 6 shows that rate of the fixed adjustable rate mortgages (Source: Bloomberg dated on 
30"' March, 1998) 
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rate applicable to newly originated fixed rate mortgages on 22 October, 1998. The rate 
reduced from 10.5% to 10.25%.^ ^ HKMC has already pre-committed to purchase from 
the eight participating banks during the 6-month period from mid-September 1998 to 
mid-March 1999. The amount is totally HK$3.5 billion. 
From my point of vievv, extensive research in the banking sector and the financial 
modeling needs to perform it should need to strike the balance between the funding of 
HKMC and the attractiveness of the pilot scheme in the regulating the property & 
mortgage businesses. 
A 
IV.2 Relaxation and Simplification of mortgage loan criteria 
I ^ 
IV.2.1 Simplification of the purchase of mortgage loans ^ 
In order to relieve the liquidity aspect of the money supply and to enhance the 
efficiency of the financial system. HKMC simplifies the scheme of purchasing mortgage 
loans, this can lel the banks involved to know the quota of mortgage loans they can sell in 
a year. Hence the baiiks ha\’e the greater controllability in cash flow. 
HSBC. Bank of America (Asia) Limited & Liu Chong Hing Bank show the 
positive attitudes towards in accomplish the objectives. However, one point should be 
considered is the effectiveness of this policy. One of the representatives in the banking 
sector mentioned that the most effective method is to relax the benchmark of 40% to the 
4 
12 The information is provided from the press release from HKMA, dated on October 22, 1998 
13 Source: Sing Tao Daily News (30"、October, 1998) 
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mortgage businesses in the banking portfolio. And also some people mentioned that in 
order to get the results satisfactory, the processing time is best not to exceed two days. 
Although the effectiveness may not greatly enhance, this is a good opportunity to 
implement it. 
IV.2.2 Relaxation of the criteria of the mortgage loans 
accepted by HKMC 
In June 1998，HKMC decided to increase the pool of the mortgage loans that they 
can accept by relaxing the criteria of the mortgage loans they targeted. Previously HKMC 
only accepts the mortgage with first legal charge, but now it also accepts the mortgage 
loans with the second legal charge. This greatly expands the portfolio HKMC can choose 
as from the words of Mr.Y.T.Cheung. Vice President of Private Banking of Citibank.'^ 
The nevv criteria have already covered the majority of mortgage loans outstanding. 
Someone will worry about that the new" criteria wi l l increase the default risk borne 
by HKMC. To cope with this issue, there are maii>. restrictions for qualification of 
mortgage loans: firstly, the mortgages that ha\e the second legal charge are provided by 
lhe governmental bodies, property developers and their subsidiaries, and other registered 
financial institutions. Secondly, the mortgages in which the total amount of repayment 
cannot exceed 50% of the total income during this period. Lastly, the mortgage loans 
provided by the banks cannot exceed 90% of the assessment of the property. Apart from 
_ I I I I i 
14 The opinion is quoted from the Oriental Daily News, dated on 30'^  June, 1998. One point would 
be reminded is that although HKMC will accept those mortgages which have the second legal charge, it 
will not accept the portion that use in the second legal charge purposes. 
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this, the new criteria will not worsen the economic situation, it is because before the 
handover, the speculators boom the property market, and therefore the default risk wil l be 
high. Now the market is in a bad atmosphere and although the property marketjumps out 
from the bottom of the business cycle in 1999, it does not seem to have the significant 
enhancement in the recovery phenomenon. Thus the relaxation of the criteria will not 
increase the burden to the property market. 
Although these two strategies use different approaches, they also have the 
common goal- to enhance the efficiency of the financial system in Hong Kong, and to 
give more liquidity to the banking sector. 
IV.3 Debt Issuance Activities 
lri the HKMC proposal, the funding in initial stage is based on the issue of 
unsecured debt securities, ln 1998. HKMC pursued the Note Issuance Programme (NIP) 
and Debt Issuance Programme (DIP) to meet the funding needed. 
IV.3.1 Note Issuance Programme (NIP) 
HKMC has signed the HK$20 billion Note Issuance Programme at January 6， 
1998. This is the one of the core activities of HKMC to raise the fund for the purchasing 
of mortgages. Up to date, there are 6 tenders made which received by the various parties 
in the community. The summary is shown in Appendix,7. Under the Note Issuance 
Programme, notes wil l be sold from time to time by appointed dealers and market 
makers. For example, the institutions who succeed in the tender held on February 5, 1998 
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were Dao Heng Bank, First Pacific Bank, International Bank of Asia and ORIX Asia 
Limhed.i5 
The Note Issuance Programme can perform the duties in a high efficiency. From 
the speech o fMr . Joseph C.K. Yam, ChiefExecutive of Hong Kong Monetary Authority, 
the programme enables HKMC the facilitate its funding at a lower cost. Moreover, the 
action can run smoothly as there is a well-established infrastructure to assist the issuing 
activities. The notes wil l be cleared through the Central Moneymarkets Unit and under 
the Liquidity Adjustment Facility (“LAF”)，the notes are eligible for discounting. This 
ensures the liquidity and the attractiveness of the notes in the secondary market. Other 
than this, Hong Kong Monetary Authority has the experiences in the issuing activities 
before as it handles the note issuance programme of Mass Transit Railway Corporation 
and the Airport Authority. Thus the technical problems in the programme can be 
managed by HKMA in an efficient way. 
lV.3.2 Debt Issuance Programme (DIP) 
This programme is launched in June 1998. The amount is HK$20 billion. The 
main objective is to supplement the Note Issuance Programme. As mentioned in section 
IV.3.1, the target group is the financial institutions. In order to widen the coverage of the 
client base, the debt issuance programme wil l target at the institutional investors. 
In order to facilitate the transaction, HKMC increases the networking by 
employing the dealers and sellers group in the debt securities distribution process.'^ The 
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programme allows HKMC to make the flexible offering to distribution mechanism in 
order to tailor made for the requirements of the participants. 
The marketability of the debt & note has a bright outlook, it can be observed from 
the performance of inaugural issue on October 29, 1998. Due to the favorable response 
from the participants, the issue size increased from HK$500 million to HK$700 million." 
The author thinks that there are some areas need to put into consideration. Firstly, 
the marketability of The Note Issuance Programme and the Debt Issuance Programme. 
Although Hong Kong Monetary Authority has experiences in the note issuance 
programme such as KCRC, but the inherent factor of marketability is mainly based on the 
performance of the institutions, thus HKMC has the direct effect and the casual 
relationship with the debt issuance activities. 
IV.4 Forward Commitment Facility 
As mentioned in section IV.1 & IV.2.1. the pilot scheme for purchasing the 
mortgage loans and the controllability of cash flow by giving the banks to know the quota 
they sold to HKMC are used to accomplish the mechanism of the banking sector. 
However, it only accept the fixed rate mortgages. The forward commitment facility 
announced at July 10, 1998 can complement it. 
15 Appendix 8 gives the brief description of the successful participants in the tender (Source: 
Bloomberg) 
t 
16 Appendix 9 shows the list of the primary dealers and the sellers group 
17 "Debt Issuance Activities" Section- HKMC Bi-monthlv report (December, 1998) 
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Under this facility, HKMC will commit to purchase from the approved seller an 
agreed amount of eligible floating rate mortgages at a specified price within a specified 
period of up to 12 months. HKMC has entered into the forward commitment facility 
arrangement with 16 sellers for totally HK$15 billion. The pricing of the mortgages is 
based on the stand-alone approach and bundle approach.'^ 
IV.5 Morteage Guarantee Scheme— 
As the property market in Hong Kong is located in the trough in 1998, the 
ingredients to trigger the market is to emphasize on the demand, size, similar to the 
Keynesian approach during the recession in 1930s. 
Under this scheme, it enables home buyers to secure mortgage loans up to 85% 
loan to valuation (LTV) ratio. HKMC will provide a guarantee at a fee to the approved 
seller for an amount up to 15% of the property value, in which the maximum LTV ratio is 
only 70%. The exposure of the guarantee is hedged by taking oui an insurance of equal 
amount with a mortgage insurer. The mechanism is shown in Appendix 4. This scheme 
can benefit many parties. From the scheme, as mentioned above, the home buyers can 
enjoy the maximum LTV ratio. HKMC get the guarantee fee from the guarantee il gives 
to the banks, and Mortgage insurer provides the insurance but have the guarantee fee in 
return, 
< 
18 The details are mentioned in Appendix 10 
19 The briefintroduction of the scheme published by HKMC is shown in Appendix 11 
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Till now, there are four companies participated the mortgage guarantee scheme: 
General Electric Mortgage, United Guarantee Mortgage Idemnity Corp, PMI Mortgage 
Insurance and Hang Seng Insurance. On 24 February 1999, HKMC announced that the 
insurance premium is ranged from 1.35% to 2% for the mortgage which has the LTV 
ratio over 70%. The exact amount depends on the nature, the lending period and the 
proportion ofborrowing.^^ 
From the survey done by one of the properties agency, 80% of the sample think 
that the mortgage insurance premium is too high, and nearly 70% of the sample do not 
decide to enter the scheme. Unfavorable response from the home buyers do not imply 
that the scheme does not achieve the objectives. The adverse effect may be due to the 
lack of experience towards this scheme. On the other hand, the banking sector gives the 
sound response to this scheme. The representative from the Siandard Chartered Bank 
mentioned that the scheme could bring the benefits to the primary mortgage market as 
well as secondary one. Also, the scheme can relieve the burden of the home buyers in the 
first payment, it can stabilize the properly market in long term. iMoreovei,. the scheme 
imposed the criteria for the mortgage guarantee scheme, this will restrict the speculation 
ofeagerness ofthe speculation in the property market."' 
Another survey provides the implication that the majority still prefer 70% LTV 
ratio instead of 85%. The reason is mainly due to the expensive mortgage premium and 
the frequency of the payment. 
‘ I I I •!_• i 
2*^  Appendix 12 lists the details of the mortgage insurance premium 
21 Appendix 13 states out the criteria for the mortgage Issuance Programme, press release from 
HKMA(24"' February, 1999) 
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Although there are some opposing voices towards the scheme, the fact proved that 
the bright future outlook of the scheme could be observed. On 31 March 1999, HKMC 
signed the Master Mortgage Insurance Policy with 26 approved sellers. After signing the 
policy, the approved sellers can offer mortgages up to 85% loan to valuation ratio. Apart 
from relaxing the amount of mortgages in the mortgage market, HKMC also benefit from 
hedging the exposure of the insurance by reinsurance of an equal amount with an 
approved reinsurer."" 
However, there are areas of concern. Firstly, HKMC lower the credit rating for 
the insurance companies it accepts, from AA grade to A grade. The purpose is to wider 
the basket of the insurance companies for HKMC to select. However, HKMC should 
strike the balance between the rating and the size of the pool. The insurance companies 
should have the capabilities in the financial aspect in performing the tasks effectively. 
Secondly, some people will doubt about the effectiveness of the mortgage guarantee 
scheme as from the past data, the LTV ratio is in the range between 55% and 60%. which 
is far from the 90% LTV ratio set by the scheme." ' 
Towards the Mortgage Guaraniee Scheme, the author feels that the scheme cannot 
act as the effective weapon in mortgage market in Hong Kong. The reason is twofold: 
firstly, although the extent of speculation in the property market is diminished after ihe 
Asian financial crisis, it is still on average higher than those in the western countries. Due 
lo the financial constraints and the conservative attitudes of the property and the banking 
sector in this instant, enlarge the limit does not trigger, the over-borrowing of the 
22 The list of the Approved Sellers will be shown on Appendix 14 
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mortgage loans. Secondly, the speculators only perform the "hit and run" strategy in the 
property market. It does not have impact to them as the speculators can choose to borrow 
only a small amount of capital. 
IV.6 Board of Director 
In March 1997，the Financial Secretary has been appointed as the Directors of the 
Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation Limited, and Mr. Joseph Yam was appointed as 
Deputy Chairman of the HKMC. Other members are drawn from different sectors in the 
community. 
In order to strengthen the ability of Board of Director, there were two adjustments 
ill human resources allocation. In September 1998, Ms Pamela Lamoreaux was being 
appointed as the Chief Operating Officer o fHKMC. Before she joined HKMC. she acted 
as the Director of International Housing Services of Fannie Mae. Thus she has much 
experiences in the mortgage businesses. On January 1999. Mr. Bernard C. Chan, who is 
currently Deputy Managing Director of Asia Insurance Company, replaces Mr. Andrew 
LT . Sheng. Mi.. Sheng has resigned from the Board following the assumption of his 
position as the Chairman of the Securities and Futures Commission. He is also a 
Legislative Councilor and a member of the Mandatory Provident Fund Scheme Advisory 
Committee. 
On 22 March 1999，there is a great change in the composition on the board of 
j 
Directors in the Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation. It can be recognized that there are 
some parties from the non-government institutions. The rationale is understandable. The 
23 The trend of the loan-to-valuation ratio is shown in graph 7, the period is from May 1998 to 
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fine tuning process of the policy pursued by HKMC can be greatly enhanced as the 
opinions from the representatives of the non-government institutions are valuable. Also, 
it also align with the plan mentioned in the HKMC proposal that the privatization of 
mortgage corporation will be held in the later stage. The composition of Board of 
Director is shown in Appendix 15. 
This is the good sign in upgrading the effectiveness of HKMC. One concern 
inside the Board of Directors is that the duration of the appointment may be a little bit 
short. As the success of the institutions is a long term objective, the frequent turnover of 
the participants mat lead to some miscommunications between parties. Thus I think that 
the change in the composition need to be enforced step by step. 
IV.7 Performance of Mortgage Market 
As the mortgage business was one of the major vehicles for the revenue 
generation in the banking sector, it is greatly affected by this declining industry after the 
financial turmoil. It can see from the amount of the new mortgage loans permitted by the 
banking sector in the past few months. Although there is the new mortgage loans 
increased in November 1998 compared to that in October 1998. it situated in the 
downward trend in the past 6 consecutively months (From March 1998 to October 1998), 
so it is not as large as that in the period before March 1998.^ ^ This phenomenon reflected 
that the primary mortgage market was active in September and October 1998. However, 
January 1999. (Source: HKMA Residential Survey) 
24 Graph 8 shows the data sourced from Rating and Valuation Department 
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from the prediction of the bankers, the growth wil l not persist for long in the near future 
in the primary mortgage market.^^ 
111 order to survive in the economy, the banking sector stresses on gaining the 
market share in the mortgage market. They achieved the objectives by adopting 
aggressive strategies in mortgage lending. Recently, they are fighting for customers by 
offering competitive rates. Apart from the competition with respect to the mortgage rate, 
the banks also start to provide supplements as to increase the competitiveness. For 
example, in addition to pursue the adjustment in the mortgage rate, Hang Seng Bank also 
provides the shopping discount and free fire insurance for the first 6 months.^^ This 
phenomenon is pretty obvious in January 1999. Hong Kong Property Services (Agency) 
managing director Mr. Michael Choi Ngai-min also have the similar point of view as 
other property developers. He foresees the decline in the mongage businesses in the first 
two months and will start to recover in March 1999 based on the prediction of renewed 
buyer demand. 
Moreover, there is a concern in lhe mortgage market as il experienced a rising 
irend of delinquency ratio. From the surveys of Hong Kong Monetary Authority, the 
delinquency ratios of the market for overdue over three months are between 0.1%-0.21% 
before 1998. However, the ratio increased to 1.07% in February 1999, it was mainly due 
to the economic downturn. 
i 
25 The opinion is given by Mr. L.K. Chin, President of Bank of America (Asia) Limited & Mr. 
T.C. Lau, Business Development Manager of Wing Lung Bank 
26 Appendix 16 summaries the privilege of the banks offers in the secondary mortgage market 
(26"' December, 1999,Oriental Daily News) 
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CHAPTER V 
THE REACTION TOWARDS THE POWERFUL VEHICLE 
As interaction between different constituents can give the synergy effect to Hong 
Kong Mortgage Corporation, it is valuable for us to know the attitudes of various parties 
towards the emergence of this vehicle. In Chapter III & IV，it has already gives the full 
picture and the operation of HKMC. In order to get the satisfactory result through the 
modification of the corporation, the opinions from different parties are invaluable to 
HKMC. 
V.1 Banking Sector 
The main objective of HKMC towards the banking sector is lo enhance the 
liquidity of lhe portfolio as well as the efficiency of the financial system. From the 
experience of HKMC, the techniques were welcomed by the primary dealers and the 
assigned financial institutions. As mentioned in section IV.3, debt issuance programme 
and note issuance programme issued by HKMC in 1998 become widely accepted by 
commercial banks as well as the financial institutions which do not previously engage in 
t 
direct mortgage lending become actively involved in the securitization process. Assistant 
Manager of ORIX Asia Limited stated that they choose HKMC as the target instead of 
other banks which did the mortgage securitization before because HKMC can provide the 
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clear statements and efficient procedures in the mortgage securitization, this saves a lot of 
time and resources to the sellers. 
There is a feeling that the banks are forced to sell the mortgages to HKMC ii. 
general. From the banks' point of view, there are two main reasons to sell the mortgages: 
firstly, to relieve the concentration risks; secondly, to solve the liquidity problem in the 
company. However, Selling the mortgages to HKMC will lower the quality of the 
mortgages the institutions hold. 
The fact can be observed by comparing the delinquency ratio of the mortgage 
market and the mortgage portfolio held by HKMC."^ It recognizes that the delinquency 
ratio is much less in the mortgage portfolio than that in the mortgage market. The 
underlying reasons are twofold: the unwillingness of the banks to off load the mortgages 
and the ‘cheery picking' process that the banks need to seciiritize their assets of good 
quality. 
Coins always have two sides. On the other hand, there are advantages to sell the 
mortgages to HKMC. The profit margin increases, as the change in the prime rate is 
larger than the fall in the rale that HKMC purchases. So as to get more benefits in 
monetary lerm in the expense of the credit deterioration. 
27 Graph 9 & 10 show the delinquency ratio of the mortgage market and HKMC portfolio (HKMC 
Bi-monthly report. December 199.8) 
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V.2 Home Buyers 
The establishment of HKMC brings the good news to home buyers, especially 
when the property market is in downtrend. As stated in section IV.7, there is a fierce 
competition between banks in the mortgage market, no matter in primary or secondary 
one. In January 1998, the mortgage rate was on average prime plus 1%; In January 1999, 
the rate is ranged from prime plus 25 basis points to 75 basis points."^ Table 5 shows the 
interest rate margin of the loan that the banking sector pursue in the 2H98. It can observe 
that the new loans approved mostly have the interest rate margin in the range between 0% 
to 0.25% above the best lending ratc. Thc rate gives the lower cost of funding to the 
homebuyers than previously. Thus the burden has shifted to the mortgage providers. 
The mortgage guarantee scheme facilitates the home ownership objective of 
HKMC in a certain extent. Now the average LTV ratio is 57.02%,"'^  this allows more 
freedom for the potential home buyers in the cash management. In the fundamental sense, 
the home buyers do not bear a huge cost as the property prices is not high due to the lack 
ofthe property speculation after the Asian financial crisis. However, the cyclical etYect of 
income & expenditure implies that the lack of capital is the main concern during the 
• 30 
recession. 
28 The prime rate is 8.75% in January 1999 
t 
29 The figure is LTV Ratio in February 1999 (Source: HKMA Residential Survey for February 
1999) 
30 This is the concern of government policy, we will not discuss here as this is out of the scope of 
the project 
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V.3 Property Developers 
I f the objective to increase the home ownership can accomplish, the property 
developers and HKMC also get the mutual benefits. The techniques used by property 
developers can supplement the ones that adopted by HKMC. In order to increase the 
incentive of the homebuyers under the interest rate uncertainty, a number of developers 
made special offer to purchasers of uncompleted properties. In 1998, Sun Hung Kai 
Properties gave buyers of Chelsea Heights an interest rate protection scheme, whereby 
the developers agreed to absorb the cost of any increase in interest rate above 10%. Some 
of the buyers of Symphony Bay also enjoyed the same protection. 
However, the property agency places a pessimistic point of view in the lower of 
the mortgage rate. Mr Cheung Kam Shing, Executive Director of Mei Liien Properties 
Agency Limited, said that the lower of interest rate does not motivate lhe activity of 
secondary mortgage market. Negative reaction seems to appear. This is mainly due to the 
adverse factors such as the freezing ofsalaries and the paid cut. 
Although the demand of the property is beyond the control of the developers in 
this recession period- the adjustment of the supply by the government. HKMC can assist 
property developers a little to enhance the pace of recovery. Mr. Cheung stated that ifthe 
low interest rate persist in a certain period, it can surely facilitate the objectives in 
promoting the mortgage market The situation is totally different from that at the mid of 
1997. The government does not need to put effort to cool the speculation. Thus the 
t 
benefits the property developers get can overcompensate the costs. 
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V.4 Insurance Companies 
It cannot deny that the insurance companies get the benefits from the existence of 
HKMC. The mortgage guarantee scheme set up at the end of December 1998 generated 
the revenue center for them. But the role can only clarify later as the concept of the 
mortgage guarantee has only taken the initial step in Hong Kong in March. Issues such as 
the setting of insurance premium and the fine tone process will be investigated in depth 
after the scheme enforces. 
V.5 Hong Kong Monetary Authoritv and 
Hong Konu Mortgage Corporation 
From the view o fHKMA, it situates in the good position in the establishment of 
HKMC. The development of HKMC can impose more supervision in the mortgage 
market as well as the banking institutions. It is because as mentioned earlier the mortgage 
businesses constitute a significant proportion in the profit generation. Generally speaking, 
the establishment of mortgage corporation can generate three advantages: firstly, to 
stabilize the financial system: secondly, to accomplish the home ownership objective and 
lastly, to add extra source of fund lo the government during the period ofbiidget deficit. 
It is easier to imagine that the operation of HKMC wil l have some contingencies 
in the implementation. Due to the rapid & uncertainty changes in the Hong Kong 
property market, it is a concern for HKMC to adjust the standards of the programme it 
i 
pursued with the aim to cope with the changes. Moreover, HKMA also needs to face the 
pressures from the act that did. For example, when HKMC set the mortgage purchasing 
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Standard, the political groups wi l l exert pressure in a way that certain groups of home 
buyers wi l l be more favored than the others. 
Competition also needs to be considered by HKMC. HKMC has already adjusted 
the rate that it purchases the mortgages when the mortgage rate slides in the market. 
However, some banks that provide the mortgage securitization, they wil l limit the range 
of the rate set by HKMC. The extent of competition tends to be fierce in future because: 
Firstly, the demand is decreasing as most of them in the market now are the final users 
instead of the speculators. Secondly, the supply of the housing is also in an unfavorable 
condition as the government failed to meet the target which mentioned in the policy of 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and financial budget after the handover 
(85000 units per year). The reason is that inside the 85000 units target, only 14,700 units 
are under the home ownership scheme pursued by the Housing Department, the 
remaining needs to have the contractual arrangement with the property developers or rely 
on the support of the private development agencies. The amount is far from what the 
^ I 
government expects due to the unfavorable condition ofthe econom>/ 
There is a trade off for HKMA to achieve the objectives. As mentioned in section 
lI.4. Mong Kong has a short history in the secondary mortgage market. Thus the 
programme which HKMC pursue vvill add extra burden to HKMA as all the concepts are 
31 Graph 11 & Table 6 shows the forecast of the mortgage shortfall and the growth of the demand 
of mortgages. The model assumes that 35,000 units will be produced by property developers per year. The 
remaining (50,000 units) are categorized into two groups. In the first category, it assumes that 14,700 units 
under Home Ownership Scheme (HOS) will be fully produced per year. Another 35300 units (under PSPS 
scheme, contracting, quota for application) it adopted the conservative approach by discount the units of 
production by half. The property prices are similar to HKMC assumption. LTV is set at 60% as the ratio in 
the past few months is ranged from 55%-60%. The growth in GDP is based on the rate in 1996, compared 
to the previous year. The multiply factor is derived from the proportion of the demand of mortgages 
between two model (Tlie model in graph 11 and that ofHKMC) 
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based on Fannie Mae, HKMC exposes to the risks associated with mortgage 





RECOMMENDATIONS & CONCLUSION 
After the full context of HKMC mentioned the previous chapters, there are some 
implications that we can observe. The copycat approach of HKMC from Fannie Mae 
implies that the gearing process needs to make in order to upgrade the performance of the 
institutions. 
VI.1 Recommendation 
As the economic environment between Hong Kong and U.S. is different in many 
aspects, for example, maturity of lhe mortgage market, the rules and regulations of the 
country, the valuation system due to cultural differences etc. The attitudes of various 
parties have already expressed their views towards the concept and performance of 
HKMC. To foster the capabilities ofHKMC. the followings may give some help in it. 
VL1.1 Setting ofthe Fixed Adjustable Rate ofMortgage (“FARM，’） 
The decrease in the prime rate and the competition between banks in the mortgage 
loan businesses led to the greater margin for the banks to sell the mortgages to HKMC. 
As mentioned in section IV.1, the newly originated mortgage rate offered by HKMC has 
reduced 25 basis points from 10.5% to 10.25%. Actually there are spaces for the rate to 
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move down further because the prime rate in the market fell even further, compared with 
the adjustment of the rate purchased. However, there are two resistant forces for the rate 
to fall. Firstly, the response from the banking sector is not favourable towards HKMC. ^^  
Secondly, the reduction of the rate that the mortgage loan purchased set by HKMC will 
deter the incentive of the banks to sell. HKMC also have the capability to pay a higher 
^ ^ 
price for the mortgage loans as HKMC has a positive figure in the profit item.) 
From my point of view, the change of rate that HKMC purchased should only 
adjusted in a narrow range. The reason is that in the past experience, the spread between 
the prime rate and the mortgage rate is relatively stable. In the near future, the pressure in 
increasing the besting lending rate (“BLR..) is not great as the reserve of Hong Kong 
dollars in the government sector is sufficient to hedge the financial risks in Hong Kong. 
There is no reason for HKMC to have the large adjustment in the rate. 
VI.1.2 Ways ofPromoting the Debt Securities 
Before the note issuance programme and the debt issuance programme pursued by 
HKMC. lhere is also the selling of exchange notes and bills. The way of selling them is 
lhroiigh the auction. In fact the response is pretty good and contributes the experiences 
and confidence to the institutions in administering auctions. Section IV.3 has already 
mentioned the debt issuance activities o fHKMC. The debt securities were sold in a way 
of tender offer. 
32 Section V.1 mentioned the point of view of the banking sector. 
” H K M C Bi-monthly Report (December 1998) shows the financial performance of the company 
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It cannot deny that the auction brings the greater controllability to HKMC in 
managing and the pricing of the mortgages. However, as the mortgage-backed securities 
have not issued, the way of selling this can through the underwriter to eliminate the 
uncertainty. This is one of the alternatives for the mortgage corporation to consider in the 
selling process. 
VI.1.3 The issue of Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS) 
in the second stage of development 
Previously, some paragraphs are used to state the risks would incur in the 
mortgage backed securities. At this instant, the issue of MBS has not been started yet. 
Novv it gives some suggestion for HKMC in the topic of issuance ofMBS. the underlying 
concept is based on the mortgage backed securities issuance ofFannie Mae. 
In order to get the sufficient source of fund to procure the mortgage loans, the 
marketability of the debt securities, mortgage backed securities, should be promoted, lt 
should be responsive to the needs of the investors and the market condition, thus the 
\'ariety cannot be ignored. Usually, the prospective MBS investors will consider the 
following factors in the purchasing decision: cash flow requirements balanced against 
their liabilities; average investment life requirements that fit their asset/liabilities 
matching strategy; expectation of the interest rate environment and economic factors that 
can lead to prepayments; and the other factors affecting their portfolio-hedging strategies. 
To suit the demand of the investors, HKMC can update weighted-average coupons 
(WACs) and weighted-average maturities (WAM) for the mortgages securities monthly. 
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Thus the investors have the advantage ofbeing able to access accurately the value and the 
performance of their securities over time. 
In term of variety, HKMC can imitate the way that Fannie Mae does, produces the 
wide range of standard MBS products.^^ However, the immature of the secondary 
mortgage market and the mortgage securitization pose the obstacle in enforcing it in short 
term. The smoothing effect to the MBS investors needs to take time. Another concern 
wil l be that HKMC, not like Fannie Mae, does not enjoy the geographic diversity. Fannie 
Mae MBS are issued with the mortgages acquired from the company's nation-wide 
network of mortgage lenders. It can provide investors with an important degree of 
geographic diversity that can have a favourable impact on prepayment risk. 
The strategy which HKMC can adopt is to provide actual, calendar-month 
principal paydovvn f a c t o r s : � � M B S investors use them to calculate cash flows and 
principal balances, which reflect both scheduled and unscheduled principal payments. 
This practice is welcomed in Fannie Mae because the yield of an MBS can be highly 
sensitive to the prepayments, this is the actual figure rather than lhe estimation. Thus il 
facilitates the effective hedging for MBS imestoi.s. In addition, the standardization of 
MBS and the transparency of the mortgage pool can lead to the clarification of the 
system. 
34 The example of the standard MBS products ofFannie Mae are: long term, fixed rate MBS; 
intermediate-term, fixed rate MBS; Balloon MBS; Adjustable-rate MBS; Fixed period, adjustable-rate 
MBS; Title 1 Home Improvement MBS; and Multifamily MBS. 
35 Factor represents the percentage of an MBS's original balance outstanding 
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VL1.4 Option in Debt Papers in US Dollars Denomination 
To strengthen the attractiveness of the debt papers issued by HKMC in future, it 
needs to find ways to motivate the inertia of the investors. After the financial turmoil in 
Asian countries, most currencies in Asia are depreciated in a large extent. However, 
Hong Kong, due to the linked system with US dollars, still stand firmly in a rate 
HK$7.8= lUS$. Although the peg situation will maintain in the near future, the worries 
of the foreign investors wil l deter themselves to buy the debt papers issued by HKMC. It 
is because they may worry that one day, the peg system wil l be cancelled as to maintain 
the competitiveness among Asian nations. It is possible to happen because Singapore will 
have the potential to replace the role ofHong Kong in the coming century. 
There exists some sort of currency risk that the investors need to come across. In 
order to mitigate the currency risk faced by the investors, the attractiveness can be 
enhanced by issuing US$ denomination option in HKMC"s debt papers. 
YI.1.5 Clarification ofthe Top-up loan arrangement 
As mentioned in section IV.2.2. HKMC allow the second legal charge of the 
mortgage to be inside the basket that HKMC can choose. The customers are getting more 
and more sophisticated and demand the speedy and high quality services, thus the 
transaction cost wil l become high. 
As the mortgage businesses in Hong Kong comprise the large proportion of 
businesses in the banking sector, it wil l adversely affect the profitability of the banks i f 
they transferred the costs to the mortgagors. This situation is also influenced the banks 
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that participated in offload mortgages to HKMC. The reason is that mortgagors who 
expect possible top-up loan during mortgage loan period wil l approach other banks that 
do not participate in offloading mortgages to HKMC due to the low handling fees. To 
release the worries of the banks, HKMC should lay down the code of ethics, standard and 
clear arrangement for further advances. 
VI.2 Conclusion 
Through the analysis of Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation in the previous 
chapters, the author feels that the mortgage sccuritization in Hong Kong needs to improve 
by fme tuning the mechanism of the Mortgage Corporation. It can be observed that the 
performance of Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation seems to be less effective than when 
lhe property market is up turning. 
Hong Kong, due to the immature of the secondary market, needs to perform in the 
different attitude as those in western countries. No matter how lhe marketability of the 
debt issuance activities (Note Issuance Programme & Debt Issuance Programme) is. it 
provides more channels for the capital injection to Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation. As 
more channels are used, lhe additional risks are needed lo be borne by the institution. 
Also the risk hedging becomes the tasks that Hong Kong Monetary Authority and Hong 
Kong Mortgage Corporation need to encounter. 
Another area of concern is the future of the mortgage market in Hong Kong. In 
i 
addition to the immature secondary mortgage market in Hong Kong, the situation will 
become more tough as the mortgage rate for the primary mortgage market becomes more 
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attractive in these days. Whether Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation needs to put addition 
effort in the modification to cope with the primary mortgage market still in the question. 
Mortgage guarantee scheme provides the relaxation on the credit line in the 
mortgage market, but the effectiveness is being affected from the competition of the 
primary mortgage market. These two markets wil l become "invisible rivalry" in the 
market. 
As a whole, the author places the good prospect in HKMC on the performance. 
As the objective of the mortgage corporation is to enhance the home ownership. The 
corporation and the economic environment act as the counter-parties to regulate the 
performance of the property market as well as the mortgage market. 
V1.3 Last Word 
It cannot deny that HKMC will encounter the difficulty in the functioning and the 
constraints such as the small capital base. the lack of experiences in the mortgage market 
in Hong Kong. However, in long run. it poses a bright outlook in the future, it can be 
proved lVom lhe adaptability of HKMC after the operation. It adopts the pragmatic 
approach by tailor-making the scheme and the strategies of the corporation. It needs to 
lake concern of the prepayment risk in the near future as it greatly affects the pricing of 
MBS. Interaction between the various institutions such as banking sector creates the 
synergy effect and gets invaluable advice from them. Also the widening of the source of 
t 
funds facilitates the revenue generation process. One point need to remind is that HKMC 
need to keep the basic objective- enhance the home ownership of the citizens, in the 





































































































































































































































































































PROJECTION OF DEMANS FOR RESE3ENTUL MORTGAGES 
Production Assumed average Demand for Mortgages 
(1996-2005) sale price 
(units) ($mn) (HK$ bn,1995 prices) 
Private residential 325,000 3 682.5 
flats 
HOS/PSPS flats 276,700 1 249 
Total 931.5 
Note: The assumed loan to valuation ratios are follows: 
Private residential units 70% 
HOS/PSPS flats 90% 




PROJECTION OF DEMAND FOR RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGES 
(BASED ON THE GOVERNMENTAL POLICY) 
Production Assumed average Demand for Mortgages 
(1996-2005) sale price 
(units) ($mn) (HK$ bn,1995 prices) 
Private residential 350,000 3 735 
fiats 
HOS/PSPS flats 500,000 1 450 
Total 1185 
Note: The assumed loan to valuation ratios are follows: 
Private residential units 70% 
HOS/PSPS flats 90% 
Assumption: Annual Production HOS/PSPS Flats 35000 units/year 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































MECHANISM OF HONG KONG MORTGAGE CORPORATION 
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Mortgage Guarantee Scheme 
Structure 
The structure ofthe mortgage guarantee scheme is as follows :-
Guarantee bi5wance 
15% 4- HKMC + Mortgage 
Bank Loan • •—• Lasurer 






Up to 15% ofthe value of the residential property which will allow authorized 
institutions to lend at up to 85% LTV ratio. The coverage ofthe guarantee will 
be reviewed in the light ofexperience ofoperating the scheme. 
7 1 
APPENDIX 5 
INTEREST RATE SWAP 
Ih ® 
• • 




A: Payment to the banks (subject to the floating rate) 
B: Floating rate mortgages 
C: The payment to the property owner (with the collateral in banks) 
D: Fixed payment due to Fixed Adjustable Rate mortgages (‘‘FARM，，） 
Appendix 6 
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18-Aug-9E 
THE HONG KONG MORTGAGE CORPORATION LIMITED 
^ M C PRIME RATE 10.00 PCT 
:IXED ADJUSTABLE MORTGAGE RATE FOR A TERh OF 3 YEARS 10.50 PCT 
^^!^i?^^ !00^0¾¾^^^^ ^t- hranKf;j〔j»^ ;;yU41o HongKon3:2-29?7-g000 London-171-350-7500 Hew Vork'l>12-5i8-2000 r^inceton‘609-279-3000 Singapore'226-3000 Sydneg'2-9?7?-8666 Tokyo<3-3201-8900 Sao Paulo'll-3048-4500 





DATE: 12 MARCH 1998 
ISSUER 
ISSUE NUMBER 
GGREGATE PRINCIPAL AMOUNT 
EN OR 
INTEREST PAYMENT BASIS 




IXED INTEREST DATES 
MOUNT APPLIED 
MOUNT ALLOTTED 
VERAGE PRICE (YIELD) ACCEPTED 
OWEST PRICE (YIELD) ACCEPTED 
VERAGE TENDER PRICE (YIELD) 
I ~.~9.~rnR~rg ,' i, hi ~ \' l' 1 11 r. r, . NE ~' r;. 
Appendix 7 
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8 PCT PER ANNUM 
11 MARCH 1998 
12 MARCH 1998 
12 MARCH 2001 
14 SEPTEMBER 1998, 12 MARCH 1999, 
13 SEPTEMBER 1999, 13 MARCH 2000, 
12 SEPTEMBER 2000, 12 MARCH 2001 
HK$3,222 MN 
HK$500 MN 
99.33 (8.43 PCT) 
99.10 (8.52 PCT) 
98.49 (8.77 PCT) 
73 
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ISSUER THE HONG KONG MORTGAGE CORPORATION LIMITED 
ISSUE NUMBER S302 
AGGREGATE PRINCIPAL AMOUNT HK$500 MN 
TENDER DATE 1 APRIL 1998 
ISSUE DATE 2 APRIL 1998 
W U R I T Y DATE 12 MARCH 2001 
INTEREST PAYMENT BASIS FIXED RRTE 
-IXED RATE DF INTEREST 8 PCT PER ANNUM 
INTEREST PAYMENT DATES 14 SEPTEMBER 1998, 12 MARCH 1999, 
13 SEPTEMBER 1999, 13 MARCH 2000, 
12 SEPTEMBER 2000, 12 MARCH 2001 
W U N T APPLIED HKI3,271 i1N 
W U N T ALLOTTED HK$500 hN 
WERAGE.PRICE (YIELD) ACCEPTED 98.96 (8.58 PCT) 
-OUEST PRICE (YIELD) ACCEPTED 98.80 (8.64 PCT) 
WERAGE TENDER PRICE (YIELD) 98.30 (8.85 PCT) 
Copynqht iyyb BLOUnBtKS L.P.~~hranKfurt:bi)-i^^U410 Hong Kong：2-2977-5000 London: 171 -550-7500 Hew Vork:2iS>-518-2000 
Princeton‘609-2?9-3000 Singapore'226-3000 Sydney‘2-9777-8666 Tokgo'3-3201-8900 Sao Paulo'll-3048-4500 
1448-88-0 19-Aug-98 16>14<30 
|Bloomberg 
• MHANC 丨.、1 M i JV h ETS w _“、M?«。Dims 
！ 
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ISSUER THE HONG KONG MORTGAGE CORPORATION LIMITED 
ISSUE NUMBER S201 
AGGREGATE PRINCIPAL AMOUNT HKI500 NN 
TENDER DATE 27 MAY 1998 
ISSUE DATE 28 MAY 1998 
W U R I T Y DATE 29 MAY 2000 
INTEREST PAYMENT BASIS FIXED RATE 
'IXED RATE OF INTEREST 8.5 PCT PER ANNUM 
INTEREST PAYMENT DATES 30 NOVEMBER 1998; 28 MAY 1999; 
29 NOVEMBER 1999; 29 MAY 2000 
W U N T nPPLIED HKS2,150 MN 
^OUNT ALLOTTED HKI500 MN 
^ERAGE PRICE (YIELD) ACCEPTED 98.69 (9.44X) 
-OUEST PRICE (YIELD) ACCEPTED 98.56 (9.52X) 
AVERAGE TENDER PRICE (YIELD) 98.40 (9.62X) 
^ p y n a h t iyyb tLUonytRC L.P.~~hranKfurt:b9-920410 Hong KQng:^-29//-500U London=l/^l-350-7500 Mew Vork'it>l!e!-:jiy-gnnn 
Prince!on.609-2P9-3000 Singapore-226-3000 Sgdneg.2-9?77-8666 Tokgo.3-3201-8900 SaSpaSTo-11^048-4500 






I Issue Number: |S202 j 
> --'•^ -'-'-•.••'•'••'.•.V.'.'.'-..'.'. ‘ - . I 
f p'^ ''»'»*'»'^ '«'M'"W"*»»»«»'-«<—«*.«a*»«..»>^»»,*,#«.„«*,«>.>W,.  ^_*t**^^*_*p*t^^MM>,t*it***********"*,*,t^^^,*^"**_*^*,*M*^^***u",;w,:^M^Mi;;^tt^tM,^-:;JttMitn|mi_*i*i;-*rr!f^'^;?^?,'. ‘ 
I Tender Date and Time : l ^ n e s d a y 16 September 1998 | 
j j 9 : 3 0 a . m . t o l 0 : 3 0 a . m . j 
1 Issue and Settlement Date l^, . ,_ ^ , ,^^„ i 
i . |Thursday 17 September 1998 | 
、 ：. '•"—- ........:.-‘™.：^：.：：'™ r*"---"-- ： 一 “ … .：«；. «...•. _•_ -,, ；-••. i 
j Amount on OfTer: |HK$500 million j 
1 二：:::…：:..::……….:::：:::::::.:…：.—::::::.：:.：~〜...:.二—....::::::.::二.::::.::„„二.：:.〜〜,.:::::.:—:.:旧.二 ... :::.:::::ii:ilLl--:------v---;''--j 
j Maturity: |Two years j 
^ .V.".V..'..'.'...".'.'.',V....'.V..'.'.'......v....',.',','.'. ',..“.,““““““;:„“::““, '(“““““,,““.“•“,,“:,,,“••.:“,,““,,“““,,,•“““:::.“•,“:-.• s 
I Maturi ty Date : j 18 September 2000 | 
5 r ~ " * <»«".»—.—».»....—..^..-^.»^.^.^«,.广一《,".>»“一._..一等"场《^二.„,._.,_.,.,-.".二^；^.一,_秘.二:..,.".-“,-.“丄；；纽鲁二二二.:一权衫,.,狄论 ........v..::,"-"....|: ••.•.' '•••* 
j Interest Rate : |9.5% p.a., payable semi-annually . j 
> . » . . . - . , , ^ . . . . . ^ 
i Interest Payment Dates : i 11，「。！飞==^  1  3 _ b e r 1999 j 
〉 |17 March 2000, 18 September 2000 j 
1 |Each tender must be fbr an amount ofHK$50,000 | 
|or integral multiples thereof. Members ofthe public j 
Tender Amouni : |who wish to tender for the Notes may approach j 
. IMarket Makers or Recognized Dealers on the | 
ipLiblished list j 
”" 一 : :”. f-"-""--"""-"......"......-.：.；：：..：.：.-..-...... .；.；：.： -::…“:.二.:….….:.….:.„.••• .": ;;"--| 
Other details • |Please see Information Memorandum published or \ 
I ‘ iapproach Market Makers or Recognized Dealers i 
Vi..,. . . -.i,.i.T_..,..v."^Li^.-A-L-.-j-.i „.. ^fWu"mrLW.VL"<vj^x^  � . . • *^ | 
Hong Kong Monetary Authority 
10 September 1998 
luip;//www ,inlo.uov.hk.''liknia/new/prc.ssj'hkmc/981126e3.htm 
77 
j Issue Number: |S304 i 
ifrender Date and Time : | = ^ 丨 似 一 DecemblTiTQ^ | 
\ ; 9:30 a.m. to 10:30 a.m. 
:^ :"."......"：»»；.»；....».......»« :.:.二.……“ .;:^  :;V：；；；；：：；......；........；.......；....；......：.；...……..“...…： —,^„ ; ,^ „^ | 
！ Issue and Settlement Date L . . ^ , , , n n 。 i 
:iThursdayDecember 3 1998 | 
U 一 : U = _ — 一 „ ^ _ ^ 
I Amount on Offer: |HK$500 million i 
I .:::::二：二二二二二::...：二：二二二二:二；：二„:二::：^  - .」 
丨  Maturity : Three years 
i Maturity Date: December 3 2001 1 
:j -?:--'"-"-.-•-.•-""•' -?.:-....---.• "-_:•-?-.-•.“……-•  •_•: jv_-.....:.:-.". .-.'.-.-;.-.;•.-• ••.• --••--•• • -•-•-••-• -• • _..__ 
I Interest Rate : - 7.50% p.a., payable semi-annually 
i —.. v»-,..,：-.；： .„； •—=:“.:«".,；；«;j,；；.；^.. -•-,-• ,.-/^-,-::,.; :-,_.' ；；•—— ； : 二: 
I ;|june 3 1999, December 3 1999 
Interest Payment Dates : ;|June 5 2000，December 4 2000 
|^June 4 2001，December 3 2001 
|Each tender must be for an amount ofHK$50,000 
j |or integral multiples thereof. Members of the public 
！ Tender Amount : |who wish to tender for the Notes may approach 
I |Market Makers or Recognized Dealers on the 
i !published list 
：  ‘ 
〖••»• . I; I •"；•"_• :••:_ 
；Other details iPlease see Information Memoranckim published or j 
3 ( |approach Market Makers or Recognized Dealers 
Hong Kong Monetary Authority 
26 November 1998 
Press Releases http:/ /vvww.info.gov.hky'hkma/eng/press/ latest /990226e3.htm 
7 8 
Tssue Number |S203 
T^der DateandTime | ™ ^ ^ ' ^ ^arch 1999 -
9:30 a.m. to 10:30 a.m. 
j^ ^^^^ ^ d Settlement~|Friday,5Marchl999 
Amount on Offer |HK$500 million 
Maturity |Two years 
Maturity Date 15 March 2001 
___^_^__^_^^^ _^________^ _^_^_^^^ _^_^_^ _^__^ _^___^ _^____^^^^^_^___^__^__^_^_^^^_^ _^^____^____^_^______^ _^_^ _^__^____^  . ... 
Interest Rate 7.70% p.a., payable semi-annually | 
j^Sep^mber 1999 -—- - j 
InterestPaymentDates g ^ ； ^ ; 。 | 
5 March 2001 1 
t 
� „ pach tender must be f5Fi ir iSi^nHr^fH�Sr50;W0"5rTn^Ti�！ 
Tender Amount multiples thereof. Members of the public who wish to tender 
for the Notes may approach Market Makers or Recognized , 
j Dealers on the published list ； 
U . u _ „ p j - . - ; i _ [PreiFfi^—rSfibh-iEi^FMSH^Sfiird^iHrfiJ&irsKM—b—F^^roi^——； 
|umer uemiis Market Makers or Recognized Dealers i 
I 
i 
Hong Kong Monetary Authority 
26 February 1999 j 
I 
U p d a t e d O n 26 Fcb 1999 | 
« 
Back i 
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j M a E S E S M M K E E H H M i X ^ n O H B M D Q n ] 
TENDER RESULTS FOR MORTGAGE PURCHASE 19-Aug-9E 
THE HKNC IS PLEASED TO ANNOUNCE THE RESULTS OF THE TENDER HELD ON 5 FEB 1998: 
RMOUNT TENDERED HONG KONG DOLLARS 2454.7 MILLION 
W U N T ALLOTTED HONG KONG DOLLARS 1,000 MILLION 
1INIhUh NET REQUIRED YIELD 10.25X 
10RTGAGE PRODUCT TYPES PADI, PAMI, PADT, PAhT 
10RTGAGE PURCHASING CRITERIA PR0001, PR0002 
WERAGE ACCEPTED YIELD 10.42% 
-OUEST ACCEPTED YIELD 10.26X 
1ININUM GROSS MORTGAGE RATE 10.76% 
1AXIMUM GROSS MORTGAGE RATE 12.50X 
THE FOLLOUING AUTHORIZED INSTITUTIONS ARE SUCCESSFUL IN THEIR BIDS: 
DAO HENG BANK, FIRST PACIFIC BANK, INTERNATIONAL BANK OF ASIA AND 
]RIX ASIA LIMITED. 
Copyright 1998 BLOOHBERC L.P.~~Frankfuri'69-920410 Hong Konq»2-2977-5000 London-171-550-7500 Nev> Vork'212-3ia-2000 
Prince ton•609-279-3000 Singapore‘226-3000 Sydneg‘2-S777-B666 ToKyo'3-3201-8900 Sao Paulo'11-3048-4500 
1448-88-0 19-Aug-98 16-14^45 





HKMC DEBT ISSUANCE PROGRAMME 
Primary Dealers 
• Dresdner Kleinwort Benson 
• HSBC Markets 
• Merrill Lynch Far East Limited 
• Tokyo-Mitsubishi International (HK) Limited 
• Warburg Dillon Read 
Selling Group Members 
• The Bank ofEast Asia Limited 
• Chase Manhattan Asia Limited 
• Citibank, N.A. 
• Commonwealth Bank of Australia 
• Dao Heng Bank Limited 
• Deutsche Morgan Grenfell Capital Markets Limited 
• Goldman Sachs (Asia) L.L.C 
• Hang Seng Bank Limited 
• J.P.Morgan Securities Asia Limited 
• Societe Generale Asia Limited 
• Standard Chartered Bank, Hong Kong 
Source: HKMC Bi-monthly Report (December. 1998) 
/ / 
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T H E HONG KONG MORTGAGE CORPORATION LIMITED 82 
Forward Commitment Facility to Purchase Mortgages 
Forward Commitment Facility 
Under the facility, the HKMC will comment to purchase from an Approved Seller an ‘ 
agreed amount ofeligible mortgages at specified price within a specified period of up 
to 12 months. 
Eligible Sellers 
All HKMC Approved Seller/Servicers will be eligible for the forward commitment 
facility. 
Commitment Period 
HKMC wil l offer forward purchase commitments for a period up to 12 months. 
To avoid gross under-utilization of the committed amount, a 12-month commitment 
wil l be split into 2 periods (6 months plus remaining period). At the end of the first 6 
months, HKMC will review the utilization of the facility and decide whether and i fso 
how much of the unused amount can be rolled over to the remaining period. For 
example, the HKMC may commit to buy from an Approved Seller HK$500 mn of 
conforming mortgages within 6 months' time and another $500 mn in the next 6 
months, thereby making up a total forward commitment o f $ l bn. I f only $200 mn is 
used in the first 6 months then the HKMC wil l consider whether the unused amount 
($300 mn) should be rolled over or allocated to other Sellers which are keen to sell 
more mortgages to the HKMC. The HKMC may revise the terms and conditions of 
the rolled-over amount in light of the prevailing market conditions. The terms and 
conditions of the original forward commitment for the second 6-month period wil l , 
however, remain valid and not be affected by the decision on the roll-over. 
Commitment Amount 
The amount of the facility for individual Approved Sellers wi l l be determined on a 
case-by-case basis having regard to HKMC's aggregate business target to purchase 
mortgages within that period. For operational efficiency, the minimum size of the 
facility isset at HK$lOQ mn: Smaller amounts and other ad hoc requests l o r ~ 
.""""mortgage" sale will continue to be handled through the existing tender or private 
placement approach. 
1 
Eligible Mortgages 83 
Floating rate mortgages, which conform to the HKMC's purchasing criteria, wi l l 
qualify for sale under the forward commitment facility. The facility wil l not cover 
fixed rate mortgages as there are separate arrangements for the purchase of such 
mortgages. 
It is clearly undesirable for HKMC to purchase mortgages, which are in negative 
equity through this progamme. For mortgages whose current Loan-to-Value ratio 
(LTV) i^_above 90% at the time of_gale, the Approved Seller wil l be required to , 
provide a warranty for the repurchase (or substitution) of such mortgages which 
become delinquent (i.e. overdue for more than 90 days) in the subsequent 18 montlis 
after purchase. 
The HKMC wi l l use its internal model to assess the current value of the underlying 
property of the mortgages to determine their current LTV. I f the Seller contests 
HKMC's valuation, it may, at its own expense, engage a professional surveying firm 
to assess the current value of the property. 
Pricing 
Same as the existing practice under the private placement and the tender approach, 
the Net Required Yield fNTRY) on the mortgages may not be exactly the same for all 
the Approved Sellers. Due regard will be given to the prevailing market conditions 
and the underwriting practices of the Approved Sellers. For instance, mortgages 
originated subsequent to the date of the forward commitment may be priced 
differently than mortgages originated prior to the signing of the forward 
commitment. 
Commitment Fee 
As the HKMC wil l need to stand ready to purchase mortgages from the Approved 
Sellers as and when they decide to do so, the HKMC wil l need to manage its 
funding carefully and flexibly to meet this requirement and to provide capital for the 
commitment. As there wil l be extra burden and costs for the HKMC in offering the 
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Press Release 丨丨“ 
Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation 
Mortgage Guarantee Scheme 
The Board ofDirectors of the Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation 
QSKMC) has given its approval in principle for the Corporation to partner with 
mortgage insurers to launch a mortgage guarantee scheme which will enable 
home buyers to secure mortgage loans up to 85% LTV ratio. 
Under the proposed scheme, the HKMC will provide a guarantee 
at a fee to the lending bank (which has to be an Approved Seller ofthe HKMC) 
for an amount up to 15% of the value of the property. The HKMC will fully 
hedge the exposure of the guarantee by taking out an insurance of equal 
amount with a mortgage insurer. (See the attached technical note for further 
details o f the proposed framework). 
“This is a win-win solution for all parties : home buyers, banks, 
HKMC and the insurance industry. The arrangement will also help to improve 
the liquidity in the property market, particularly in respect of secondary 
property transactions. With the approval of the Board, we will conduct detailed 
negotiations with thc mortgage insurers on the terms of the back-to-back 
mortgage insurance and seek formal authorization as an authorized insurer 
under the Lisurance Companies Ordinance. Ifeverything goes well, we expect 
to launch the product in the fifst quarter of 1999,” said Mr. Donald Tsang, 
Chairman of the HKMC. 
^ ^h,4ly.i,wita Hong K(tnx SAR Covernm<ni Cvr(H>rt,H,.,t ihn>u^h ih<f lixrfHmn- ri,nJ j | | 
llti9/9HV9rjf&V(JX^/iSigf^HKf* t^.fHMl// _ 
T ^ *^ WW ^ ^ u\^ •。*。。 I JNU>t i I i lC I 1|\ I IWl ^^<^ jc S^ UI \J L. cu t U CUU^^—”UA r , tJ%J 
8 5 
Mr. Joseph Yam, Deputy Chairman of the HKMC added, “Asset 
quality of the mortgage loans remains my top concern. For prudent risk 
management, the HKMC will provide a guarantee only in respect ofmortgages 
conforming to its purchase criteria, including notably a maximum debt to 
income ratio of 50% which will cover the additional portion guaranteed by the 
HKMC and the requirement on owner occupancy. The scheme is consistent 
with the 70% LTV ratio policy as the banks' exposure will still be capped at 
70%.” 
3 December 1998 
Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation 
r 
*^  “ <w • 一 一 W •。• w • » I NWt • I t I <M I II、 I IWI V^Wk^U *WW I 卜 k_ Sf U I W 4^WW^^^U' • ( • Kj%m/ 
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Coverage Period 
The guarantee provided by HKMC will be in force until the outstanding 
principal of the mortgage loan falls below 70% of the value of the property at 
the time of origination. 
Eligible Mortgages 
All mortgages conforming to HKMC's purchasing criteria (see below), 
irrespective ofwhether the loans will be sold to the HKMC, will be eligible for 
the mortgage guarantee. This will apply to both floating rate and fixed rate 
mortgage loans. The relevant criteria are as follows : 
Floating Rate Fixed Rate 
Mortgage Mortgage 
1. Maximum loan size HKS5,000,000 HK$4,000,000 
2. Maximum Debt-to-kicome ratio 50% 50% 
ODTQ at origination, including the . 
guaranteed portion 
3. Maximum sum of “original term" 40 years 40 years 
and ‘‘age of property at 
origination" 
Eligible Mortgage Originators 
All authorized institutions which are Approved Seller ofthe HKMC. 
Payment Method for the Guarantee Fee 




M O R T G A G E I N S U R A N C E P R O G R A M M E 
RATE SHEET * 
Mortgage Insurance Premium 
Mortgage Type Loan to Loan Single Annual Premium 
Value Tenor Premium Payment 
Ratio (Years) Payment 
(LTV) 
First Year Renewal 
(% of the original (% of original (% of original 
principal balance) principal principal 
balance) balance) 
FLOATING Up to 10 1.00 0 50 0 24 
• E 80% 15 1.15 0.60 0^24 
“ 20 1.40 0.70 0.24 
25 1.50 0.75 0.24 
30 1.65 0.85 0.24 
Upto 10 1.55 0.70 0.45 
85% 15 1.80 0.80 0.45 
20 2.15 0.90 0.45 
25 2.30 1.00 0.45 
30 2.40 1.10 0.45 
FIXED Up to 10 0.95 0.45 0 24 
ADJUSTABLE 80% 15 1.10 0 55 0 24 
RATE(FARM) 20 1.35 0.65 0^24 
25 1.45 0.70 0.24 
30 1.55 0.80 0.24 
Up to 10 1.40 0.65 0 40 
85% 15 1.70 0.75 0.40 
20 1.95 0.85 0.40 
25 2.05 0.95 0.40 
30 2.20 1.05 0.40 
* ( F o r indicat ive p u r p o s e on ly ) 
88 
Product Loan-to-Valuation Insurance Premium 
Type 
Single Payment Annual Payment Method 
Method 
Initial Year 2"^  to 6'V?'^  Year 
% of $ % of $ % of $ 
Loan Loan Loan 
amount amount amount 
Floating Up to 80% 1.40 21,000 0.70 10,500 0.24 3,600 
Rate 
Mortgage ^p to 85% 2.15 32,250 0.90 13,500 0.45 6,750 
Fixed Rate Up to 80% 1.35 20,250 0.65 9,750 0.24 3,600 
Mortgage 




Eligibility Criteria for Mortgage Insurance Programme 
Descript ion: Criteria for Floating Rate mortgages and Fixed Adjustable Rate Mortgages (FARM) 
with LTV greater than 70% on private residential properties that are eligible for 
the H K M C Mortgage Insurance Programme. 
Pursuant to Chapter 3 o f the Mortgage Insurance Operational Manual, El igibi l i ty Criteria for the 
Mortgage Insurance Programme comprise of the fol lowing: 
(1) Mortgage Conditions 
(2) Core El igibi l i ty Criteria 
The Core El igibi l i ty Criteria are summarised below. Please refer to the Operational Manual for 
details. 
Product type Floating rate mortgages 
Fixed adjustable rate mortgages (FARM) 
Maximum loan size at origination Floating Rate: HK$5,000,000 
FARM: HK$4,000,000 
Loan-to-value determination: 
• Maximum loan-to-value ratio (LTV) at 85o/o 
origination ( the financed premium may cause LTV to go 
s l ight lyover85%) 
Valuation teport Written valuation report prepared by internal 
professionals or qualified external surveyors. 
Debt-to-income ratio calculation: 
• Maximum Debt-to-income ratio at 50% 
origination 
• Relationship requirement between immediate family members or relatives 
Borrowers and Mortgagors, and 
between Borrowers/Mortgagors and 
Guarantors 
Maximum original term to maturity 30 years 
90 
Minimum original term to maturity 10 years 
Maximum sum of "remaining term to 40 years 
maturity" and "age of property at 
origination" 
Owner Occupancy At least one of the mortgagor(s)/borrower(s) must 
occupy the property as a primary residence 
Legal Charge First fixed legal charge 
Refinancing Refinanced mortgages with no cash-out 
































































































































































































































































































































































































March 22, 1999 
Hon Donald Y.K.Tsang, JP (Chainnan) Financial Secretary 
Mr. Joseph C.K.Yam (Deputy Chairman) Chief Executive 
Hong Kong Monetary Authority 
Hon Ronald J. Arculli, JP Legislative Councillor 
Partner of Woo Kwan Lee & Lo, Solicitors 
Hon Bernard C. Chan Legislative Councillor 
Deputy Managing Director 
Asia Financial Group 
Hon Chan K wok Keung Legislative Councillor 
Mr. Nonnan T.L. Chan, JP Deputy Chief Executive 
(Executive Director) Hong Kong Monetary Authority 
Mr. Eddy C.Fong, JP Certified Public Accountant and Senior Partner 
of PricewaterhouseCoopers 
Ms. Anita Y.M. Fung Head of Asian Fixed Income Trading, HSBC 
Mr. Rafael S.Y.Hui, JP Secretary for Financial Services 
Mr. Lam·Yim-nam Deputy General Manager 
Bank of China, Hong-Kong Branch 
Mr. Anthony Robert Latter Deputy Chief Executive 
(Executive Director) Hong Kong Monetary Authority 
Dr Hon David K.P .Li, LLD (Cantab), JP Legislative Councillor 
Chairman & Chief Executive 
Bank of East Asia Limited 
Mr. Ng Kwok-wai Chief Executive 
Allied Capital Resources Limited 
Hon Sin Chung Kai Legislative Councillor 
Mr. Dominic S.W.Wong, JP Secretary for Housing 
Ms. Anna H.Y. Wu, JP Solicitor & senior partner 
Robert W.H. Wang & Co. 
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APPENDIX 15 
The Composition ofthe Board of Directors ofHong Kong Mortgage Corporation 
March 2 0 , 1 9 9 7 
Mr. Donald Y.K Tsang Financial Secretary (Chairman) 
Mr. Joseph C.K. Yam ChiefExecutive, Hong Kong Monetary Authority (Deputy 
Chairman) 
Mr. Ronald J. Arculli 一 
Mr. Alex M.C. Lau ~ “ ‘ — 
Mr. Eddy C. Fong — 
Mr. Tom Y. Hsiao ~ 一 ： 
Dr. Huang Chen-ya “ “ — 
Mr. Edwin C.KXau — 
Mr. David K.P.Li _ 
Mr. Ngan kam-chuen — ‘ ‘ 
Ms. Anna H.Y. Wu — 
Mr. Rafael S.Y.Hui 一 Secretary for Financial Services 
Mr. Dominic S.W.Wong Secretary for Housing “ 
Mr. Andrew L.T.Sheng 1Peputy ChiefExecutive, Hong Kong Monetary Authority 
Mr. Norman T.L.Chan Deputy Chief Executive, Hong Kong Monetary Authority 
D e c e m b e r 3 1 , 1 9 9 8 
Mr. Donald Y.K Tsang Financial Secretary (Chairman) 
Mr. Joseph C.K. Yam ChiefExecutive, Hong Kong Monetary Authority (Deputy 
Chairman) 
Mr. Ronald J. Arculli ‘ 
Mr. Alex M.C. Lau “ “ 
Mr. Eddy C. Fong “ — 
Mr. Tom Y. Hsiao “ “ 
Dr. Huang Chen-ya “ 
Mr. Edwin C . K i a u ‘ 一 
Mr. David K.P.Li “ 
Mr. Ngan kam-chuen 一 
Ms. Anna H.Y. Wu ~ 
Mr. Rafael S.Y.Hui 一 Secretary for Financial Services 
Mr. Dominic S.W.Wong 一 Secretary for Housing 
Mr. Bernard C. Chan (Director) ‘ 
Mr. Norman T.L.Chan Deputy ChiefExecutive, Hong Kong Monetary Authority 
(Executive Director) 
Ms Pamela Lamoreaux (Chief Operating Officer) 
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APPENDIX 14 
APPROVED SELLERS 一 MASTER MORTGAGE INSURANCE POLICY 
1. ABNAMRO Bank 
2. American Express Bank 
3. Asia Commercial Bank 
4. BankofChina 
5. Bank ofEast Asia 
6. Chekiang First Bank 
7. Chiyu Banking Corporation 
8. Citibank 
9. Citic Ka Wah Bank 
10. Dao SingBank 
11. DaoHeng Bank 
12. First Pacific Bank 
13. Generale Belgian Bank 
14. Hang Seng Bank 
15. Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation 
16. Kwong On Bank 
17. Liu Chong Hing Bank 
18. Nanyang Commercial Bank 
19. ORIX Asia Limited 
20. Overseas Trust Bank 
21. Shanghai Commercial Bank 
22. Standard Chartered Bank 
23. United Chinese Bank 
24. Wing Hang Bank 
25. Wing Lung Bank 
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